Social Justice Feminism by Kalsem, Kristin (Brandser) & Williams, Verna L.
University of Cincinnati College of Law
University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and
Publications




University of Cincinnati College of Law, kristin.kalsem@uc.edu
Verna L. Williams
University of Cincinnati College of Law, verna.williams@uc.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.uc.edu/fac_pubs
Part of the Legal History, Theory and Process Commons, and the Women Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and
Publications. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Articles and Other Publications by an authorized administrator of University of Cincinnati
College of Law Scholarship and Publications. For more information, please contact ken.hirsh@uc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kalsem, Kristin (Brandser) and Williams, Verna L., "Social Justice Feminism" (2010). Faculty Articles and Other Publications. Paper 13.
http://scholarship.law.uc.edu/fac_pubs/13
SOCIAL JUSTICE FEMINISM
Kristin Kalsem and Verna L. Williams*
1. INTRODUCTION .................................. 132
11. WORDS AND THE MEANINGS THEY CARRY: WHAT
IS SOCIAL JUSTICE FEMINISM?9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
A. Keywords.................................. 139
B. Feminism.................................. 140
1. Feminist Movements in the Early
Twentieth Century ........................ 141
2. Feminist Movements in the 1970s and
Beyond ................................. 145
C. Social Justice............................... 147
D. Social Justice Feminism ..................... 151
1. Social Justice Feminists in the Early
Twentieth Century ........................ 151
2. Social Justice Feminism and Feminist Legal
Theory .................................. 156
111. THE NATIONAL WOMEN'S CONFERENCE: THE
SPIRIT OF SOCIAL JUSTICE FEMINISM .............. 161
A. The Event Itself ............................ 162
1. How It Came About ...................... 162
2. The National Plan of Action: Issues and
Process.................................. 163
B. Sowing the Seeds of Social Justice Feminism .. 164
1. Productive: Thinking Creatively; Thinking
Big .................................... 165
*Professors of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law. Copyright Q
2010 by Kristin Kalsem and Verna L. Williams. We would like to thank Professors
Deborah Brake, Martha Chamallas, Emily Houh, John McGuire, Kathryn Kish
Sklar, and participants in faculty workshops at Villanova School of Law and the
University of Cincinnati. We also would like to thank our law librarian James Hart
and our research assistants Lara Pierce, Jason Swartz, Rebecca Waesch, and Andrea
Yang. The research for this Article was supported by grants from the Harold C.
Schott Foundation.
131
HeinOnline -- 18 UCLA Women's L.J. 131 2010
32 UCLA WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 18:131
2. Constructive: Moving Forward
Differently............................ 167
a. Re-envisioning the Invitation List ...... 167
b. Growing Recognition of Interlocking
Subordinating Structures .............. 169
c. Asking Important Questions.......... 171
3. Healing: Sharing and Concern ............ 172
IV. METHODOLOGICAL TOOLS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE
FEMINISM............................................ 175
A. Looking to History to Understand
Subordinating Structures .................... 175
B. Examining the Interrelationships between
Interlocking Oppressions .................... 181
C. Developing Solutions Informed by a Bottom Up
Approach.................................. 183
V. AN OPPORTUNITY FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE FEMINISM:
LONG ISLAND CARE AT HOME v. COKE ............ 184
A. Case Background........................... 185
B. Applying Social Justice Feminist
Methodologies ............................. 187
1. Looking to History to Understand
Subordinating Structures ................ 187
2. Examining the Relationships Between
Interlocking Oppressions ............... 189
3. Developing Solutions Informed by a
"Bottom Up" Approach ................ 190
VI. CONCLUSION......................................... 192
I. INTRODUCTION
"I don't want to do feminism any more unless it's social justice
feminism. "1
For about three years, women leaders from national groups,
grassroots organizations, academia, and beyond gathered to ex-
amine the state of the women's movement. Spurred by a concern
about the continued vitality and relevance of the women's move-
ment, philanthropic organizations such as the Ford Foundation,
Ms. Foundation, and Astrea Lesbian Foundation for Justice,
brought together women leaders for a number of meetings and
1. Statement made by a participant of the New Women's Movement Initiative
(notes on file with authors). For more information about the NWMI see infra notes
2-14 and accompanying text.
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HeinOnline -- 18 UCLA Women's L.J. 132 2010
2010] SOCIAL JUSTICE FEMINISM13
retreats and asked them to confront and transcend their differ-
ences in order to carve out a new agenda for change. This effort,
dubbed the New Women's Movement Initiative ("NWMI"),
forced participants to examine critically the cause that many had
made their life's work.2 "The purpose of these meetings and re-
treats was to address long-standing divisions within the women's
movement and to build the relationships, trust and analysis nec-
essary to revitalize US femninism."13 Participants were diverse in
terms of race, ethnicity, economic status, sexuality, geographic
locale, and age, among other things.4 There was "an especially
strong presence of women of color, as well as a cross-genera-
tional representation of women who became active in the wo-
men's movement at various points over the past several
decades."15 Not surprisingly, these women came with myriad per-
spectives on feminism: indeed, deep divisions caused many to
question whether they were part of the same movement and
whether they could or should trust one another enough to col-
laborate in this endeavor. 6
What kept them all at the table, however, was a shared con-
cern that "the women's movement [was] not mobilizing broad
new constituencies or maximizing its potential as a social change
agent."17 Feminism - at least as it had been practiced - was not
something many wanted "to do anymore," in the words of the
participant quoted above. 8 Linda Burnham, co-founder and ex-
ecutive director of the Women of Color Resource Center and an
NWMI attendee, explained that members essentially agreed that
the "feminist project, while not completely stalled, does not have
2. See LINDA BURNHAM, THE NEW WOMEN'S MOVEMENT INITIATIVE (Aug.
16, 2007), http://ms.foundation.org/user-assets/PDF/Program/NWMSummationFinal
Draft.pdf (hereinafter the NWMI REPORT). One of these meetings included a con-
ference at the University of Cincinnati College of Law ("College") in February 2005.
Funded by the Ford Foundation and hosted by the College's Joint Degree Program
in Law and Women's Studies, this conference, "Women Coming Together: Claiming
the Law for Social Change," convened a variety of women's advocates to develop
new strategies, expand and enhance coalitions, and share ideas about how to claim




6. Burnham observed that "[s~harp differences existed over issues of how
agendas [were] set and whose interests [were] represented, where power resides and
how it [was] wielded, and which organizations and initiatives were well resourced
while others languish[ed]." Id. (alterations in original).
7. Id. (alterations in original).
8. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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the kind of political traction it needs if it is to effectively influ-
ence public policy and improve the lives of women." Regaining
momentum in the political arena was of utmost importance,
given the conservative legal and political climate that produced
recent Supreme Court decisions such as Gonzales v. Carhart,10
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company,"1 Parents In-
volved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1,12
and Long Island Care at Home v. Coke.13 Against this backdrop,
participants reached some consensus about what might revitalize
the movement: basing the movement's work on and actively
"9promot[ing] principles of social justice feminism."114 This con-
clusion intrigued both of us. As feminist law professors, we puz-
zled over the significance and implications of putting "social
justice" and "feminism" together.
This was not the first time that the results of these gatherings
had sparked our intellectual curiosity. At one of the NWMI
meetings, in order to put into context some of the issues con-
fronting women's organizing today, participants viewed Sisters of
'77,15 a documentary about the 1977 National Women's Confer-
ence in Houston. Neither of us had ever heard of the film, much
less the conference, which troubled us as feminist scholars. How
could we not know about a federally funded gathering of over
20,000 women that resulted in a political manifesto for the na-
tion's women?16
9. NWMI REPORT, supra note 2.
10. 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (upholding a federal ban on late-term abortion).
11. 550 U.S. 618 (2007) (limiting the statute of limitations for tiling employment
discrimination claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
12. 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2768 (2007) (striking down student assignment plans de-
signed to integrate elementary schools as unconstitutional).
13. 127 S. Ct. 2339, 2344 (2007) (upholding a Department of Labor regulation
denying wage protection to domestic workers).
14. NWMI REPORT, supra note 2.
15. SISTERaS OF '77 (Cynthia Salzman Mondell & Allen Mondell 2005).
16. An Official Report of the Conference, entitled The Spirit of Houston, was
issued in 1978. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE OBSERVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL
WOMEN'S YEAR, THE SP'IRIT OF HOUSTON: THE FIRST NATIONAL WOMEN's CON-
FERENCE (1978) [hereinafter OI'CIAL REPORT]. Shortly thereafter, Simon and
Schuster published a book entitled What Women Want, which put the data accumu-
lated in the Official Report into a more mainstream, populist form that included the
personal narratives of many of the Conference participants. CAROLINE BIRD ET AL.,
WHAT WOMEN WANT (1979). In her introduction to this volume, Gloria Steinem
observed the "rar[ityl" of a "published record of the political agenda of women as a
group." Gloria Steinem, An Introduction to WHAT WOMEN WANT 10, 10.
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Indeed, "there was never anything like it."'17 From Novem-
ber 18 through 21, 1977, Houston was the site of this historic
event. The documentary film captures the excitement and en-
ergy - and the sheer magnitude - of the Conference which is
difficult to translate onto the page. It was, in every sense of the
word, a happening, like the Olympic games, that gathered mo-
mentum over a 51-day period with a 2600-mile torch relay from
Seneca Falls, New York, to Houston, Texas. A gathering, like a
Democratic or Republican National Convention, with a packed
and noisy crowd waving political placards and organized around
State and Territory banners. A moment grand enough to be wor-
thy of the drafting of a re-envisioned Declaration of Sentiments
by Maya Angelou.18 The spirit of Houston was fueled by this
coming together, in a new way, of 2,006 elected delegates from
every State and Territory and 20,000 others interested in having a
say in and listening to the concerns of women across the nation.19
That this moment in history had fallen into such obscurity aston-
ished us. Even more striking, however, were the similarities be-
tween the challenges facing the women who assembled thirty
years earlier at the National Women's Conference and those that
confronted the women participating in the NWMI.
Thirty years ago, women leaders also considered how to mo-
bilize all women for social change and how to gain traction in the
political system. Over the four-day period of the National Wo-
men's Conference, this remarkably diverse and representative
group of delegates worked tirelessly, discussing, debating, and ul-
timately adopting a National Plan of Action designed to "move
history forward" 20 for the nation's women.2' The twenty-six is-
sue planks comprising the plan demanded "as a human right a
full voice and role for women in determining the destiny of our
world, our nation, our families and our individual lives." 22 Addi-
tionally, just as the NWMI participants had done, the Houston
conferees sought to heal past divisions by concretely including
women from all walks of life. Thus, organizers used much of the
federal funds23 allotted to them to ensure that the gathering
17. OMFCIAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 9.
18. Id. at 128, 195.
19. Id. at 119.
20. Id. at 15.
21. Id. at 13.
22. Id. at 15-16.
23. Congress allocated $5 million for the Conference as part of the nation's ob-
servance of the International Year of the Woman. Id. at 10.
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would be as diverse as possible, for example, by providing funds
for transportation, lodging and child care to women who other-
wise would have been unable to attend. 24
Additionally, just as today's feminist movement sought to
regroup in the face of conservative forces, organizers of the Na-
tional Women's Conference confronted resistance and derision
from the political right. For example, some predicted that the
Conference would confirm "some of the most harmful stereo-
types of women in politics"125 or that it would be "the liveliest
brawl since John L. Sullivan licked Jake Kilrain in 75 bare-knuck-
led rounds."126
Finally, while the legal landscape in 1977 included such vic-
tories as Craig v. Boren ,27 in which the Court elevated sex to
quasi-suspect status under the Constitution' 28 there also were de-
cisions that relied upon the very outdated stereotypes about wo-
men that organizers were striving to dispel. For example, in
Dothard v. Rawlinson'2 9 the Court upheld a state regulation
prohibiting women from serving as prison guards in high security
institutions incarcerating men.30 According to the majority, "wo-
manhood" itself was incompatible with maintaining order in a
prison setting.31 Moreover, just as today, debate swirled around
affirmative action: the Court was due to hear arguments in Re-
gents of University of California v. Bakke, a case that would have
implications for how far states could go in imposing remedial
measures to compensate for past discrimination based on race or
sex.32 Moreover, as historian Marjorie Spruill argues, the Con-
ference itself helped conservative forces such as Phyllis
Schlafley's Eagle Forum to gain support and momentum. 33 Thus,
the Houston conferees organized a political agenda in a con-
24. Id. at 10-11.
25. Id. at 205 (quoting The Washington Post) (internal quotations omitted).
26. Id. (quoting columnist James J. Kilpatrick).
27. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
28. See id. at 204.
29. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
30. See id. at 336-37.
31. Id. at 336 ("The employee's very womanhood would thus directly under-
mine her capacity to provide the security that is the essence of a correctional coun-
selor's responsibility.").
32. See Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 553 P.2d 1152 (Cal. 1976),
cert. granted, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
33. Marjorie Spruill, Gender and America's Right Turn, in RIGHTWARD~ BOUND:
MAKING AMERICA CONSERVATIVE IN THE 1970s 71, 71-79 (Bruce Schulman & Ju-
lian Zelizer eds., 2008).
136
HeinOnline -- 18 UCLA Women's L.J. 136 2010
2010] SOCIAL JUSTICE FEMINISM17
servative climate that would likely, at best, resist the conferees'
proposed changes.
Because of the similarities between the challenges con-
fronting women leaders thirty years ago and those existing now -
both within and outside the movement - and in the wake of a
regathering of conference participants and other leaders in the
feminist community to commemorate the thirtieth anniversary of
the National Women's Conference' 3 4 this is a particularly apt
time to analyze the Conference and what it represents. This his-
torical moment is rich with present-day relevance. Additionally,
as suggested above and as will be discussed more fully below, the
women's movement itself is at a crossroads, much as it was in the
late 1970s. According to recent research by the Center for the
Advancement of Women, less than half the women who were
surveyed believed there was a need for a strengthened women's
movement.35 Specifically, 43% of all surveyed women so be-
lieved; however, for women of color, the numbers were much
higher, with 63% of Black women and 68% of Latina women
voicing support for a stronger women's movement .3 6 Similarly,
Black and Latina women were more likely to characterize them-
selves as "feminists."137 Yet many women are disaffected from
the movement, finding that it has invested its energies in those
who are privileged because of their race, class, able-bodied sta-
tus, and/or sexual orientation .381 These women seek a movement
that will represent their interests, one that organizes from the
"bottom up," and builds leadership from those among the least
34. On November 10-11, 2007, the Bella Abzug Leadership Institute and over
70 other organizations sponsored a conference celebrating the thirtieth anniversary
of the 1977 National Women's Conference. Bella Abzug Leadership Institute, Re-
cent Events: Freedom Conference Summary, ttp://www.abzuginstitute.org/newshtm#
ConfSummary (last visited Nov. 16, 2008). This conference, entitled Freedom on
Our Terms, featured many of the original conference participants, as well as panels,
workshops, and issue caucuses. Id.
35. CENTER FOR ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN, PROGRESS AND PERIL.S: NEW
AGENDA FOR WOMEN 3 (2003), available at http://www.advancewomen.org/imnages/
uploads[Progress%20&%2OPerils%20%20A%2ONew%20Agenda%20for%2OWo-
men-i.pdf [hereinafter PROGRESS AND PERILS].
36. Id.
37. Id. at 5. Sixty-three percent of African American women and 68% of La-
tina women said that being a feminist was "an important part of who they are." Id.
Only 41 % of white women agreed. Id. These results mirror other research findings
that demonstrate that women of color identify more strongly as feminists than their
white counterparts. See, e.g., Catherine Harnois, Re-presenting Feminism: Past, Pre-
sent and Future, 20 NAT'L WOMEN'S STUD. Ass'N 120, 125-26 (2008).
38. NWMI Report, supra note 2, at 2, 4.
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empowered and most marginalized. 39 As we will discuss, the so-
cial justice feminism paradigm holds promise in addressing these
issues. Indeed, in calling for social justice feminism, the NWMI
participants appear to be taking steps very reminiscent of those
that the Houston delegates attempted to pursue thirty years ago.
Participants in the Conference recognized and highlighted
the need for coalition building across lines of race, class, ethnic-
ity, sexuality, age and other categories of identity and experience.
Organizers and participants were acutely aware of this important
aspect of the event. Gloria Steinem wrote in the introduction of
What Women Want, which tells the story of the Conference: "If
this book survives to be read by our relatives of the distant fu-
ture, it will . .. be one of the few accounts of history made and
recorded from the bottom up."140 The Conference involved the
coming together of women in a way that led the London Evening
Standard to conclude that "mainstream feminism has evolved
into the most broadly based movement for egalitarianism that
America possesses "41.
That this movement has somehow transformed from the
"broad based, egalitarian" high point of the Conference, at least
in the eyes of one observer, to splintered factions of activists who
no longer "want to do feminism" is remarkable. 42 However, the
work of the NWMI is heartening in that activists were able to
bridge some gaps, at least temporarily, by articulating a collective
desire for social justice feminism and thus identifying a new way
to proceed.
In the pages that follow, we explore the potential meanings
and significance of "social justice feminism," prompted by the
concerns of the NWMI participants. We have sought to uncover
the historical and conceptual roots of this newly articulated de-
sire to do social justice feminism. As the following will demon-
strate, social justice feminism is not a new idea; we found its
footprints in diverse political times, various women's movements,
and divergent aspects of feminist legal theorizing. By exploring
the many sources and implications of social justice feminism at
39. NWMI Report, supra note 2, at 4.
40. Steinem, supra note 16, at 10.
41. OFIMCIAL REPORT, supra note 16, 205-06 (quoting The London Evening
Standard).
42. The views of the commentator quoted at the beginning of the piece as no
longer wanting to "do feminism" reflects the views of many women who attended
the Conference and who felt the need for change. See id. at 1-3.
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this time, we hope that this article will, at the very least, facilitate
a conversation about feminist practice and theory.
In Part 1, we examine "feminism"~ and "social justice" as key
concepts. Exploring the history of these terms and aspects of the
movements that have been associated with them, we analyze the
possibilities that might emerge from their joinder. Drawing also
on historical and modern-day "social justice feminist" work, we
offer some initial thoughts on defining aspects of the concept of
"4social justice feminism." Theoretically, social justice feminism
shares many commonalities with feminist legal theory, particu-
larly critical race feminism. However, while a basic tenet of these
approaches is moving from theory to practice, social justice femi-
nism actually emerges from practice. This is what activists, seek-
ing a "broadly based movement for egalitarianism," want to do.
Thus, Part 11 focuses on practice not theory with its look back at
the National Women's Conference, convened to produce a Na-
tional Plan of Action. In this Part, we examine the seeds of so-
cial justice feminism that were sown there, as well as identifying
what, going forward, can be done differently so as not to repeat a
history that has led so many women to feel that the feminist
movement does not support what they really want. The third
Part of this Article draws on the philosophical underpinnings of
social justice feminism to set forth certain methodological tools.
Finally, Part IV applies these tools to the recent Supreme Court
case of Long Island Care at Home v. Coke,43 a case upholding
the lack of wage protections for certain domestic workers. This
social justice feminist lens reveals that rather than merely
presenting a simple question of administrative law, this case
raised powerful issues of race, gender, and class hierarchies. As
such, it deserves a prominent place on the feminist legal agenda.
11. WORDS AND THE MEANINGS THEY CARRY:
WHAT IS SOCIAL JUSTICE FEMINISM?
A. Keywords
"Social justice" and "feminism" are loaded terms, suscepti-
ble to various interpretations depending upon the context and
the user. These terms that "have an edge of energy and uncer-
tainty .. ,. in public usage"144 are "keywords" in our culture. In his
43. 127 S. Ct. 2339 (2007).
44. Tony Bennett, Lawrence Grossberg & Meaghan Morris, Introduction to
NEW KEYWORDS: A REVISED VOCABULARY OF CULTURE & SOCIETY XVii, XXii
20101 139
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influential volume, Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Soci-
ety, scholar Raymond Williams explored such freighted words
and their ranges of meanings across boundaries such as time, dis-
cipline, and audience.45 Not a dictionary, this word study was "a
record of an inquiry into a vocabulary: a shared body of words
and meanings in our most general discussions, in English, of the
practices and institutions which we group as culture and
society."146
Williams' s work is helpful in thinking about the concept of
social justice feminism for two reasons. First, his ideas on the
importance of looking at the ways in which the meanings of
words change - why and how meanings shift - are particularly
apt for examining "feminism," a term that encompasses both the-
ory and a social movement. Second, as Tony Bennett, Lawrence
Grossberg, and Meaghen Morris explain in their introduction to
New Keywords:
For Williams the point was not merely that the meanings of
words change over time but that they change in relationship to
changing political, social, and economic situations and needs.
While rejecting the idea that you could describe that relation-
ship in any simple or universal way, he was convinced that it
did exist - and that people do struggle in their use of language
to give expression to new experiences of reality.47
Williams explored the relationships of words to each other; as a
consequence, his work is helpful in thinking about the signifi-
cance of expressing the work of the women's movement in terms
of social justice feminism. Specifically, this Part will examine
how "feminism"~ - the word and the movement - might be modi-
fied by the term "social justice." Since both terms carry mean-
ings of their own, this Article will briefly examine each
separately before considering them together.
B. Feminism
The term "feminism" in the United States has been variably
a term of empowerment and scorn, a source of pride and a scath-
(Tony Bennett, Lawrence Grossberg & Meaghan Morris eds., 2005) [hereinafter
NEW KEYWORDS].
45. Neither term was included in the original 1976 volume of Keywords. See
RAYMOND WILLIAMS, KEYWORDS: A VOCABULARY OF CULTURE AND SOCIETY
(1976). However, "feminism" was a keyword in the updated 2005 New Keywords
and "social justice" is discussed under the keyword "Justice". See NEW KEYWORDS,
supra note 44, at 128-30, 193.
46. WILLIAMS, supra note 45, at 15.
47. NEw KEYWORDS, supra note 44, at xvii.
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ing insult, a call to action and a threat to mankind, a representa-
tion of unity and one of divisiveness - often all at the same time.
Historian Sara Evans has observed that from its inception, the
movement associated with "feminism" has had "a history rife
with contradiction: growth and fragmentation, innovation and in-
ternal conflict."148 Evans traces the origin of the term to late
nineteenth century France and explains that a segment of the wo-
men's suffrage movement first adopted it in the United States in
the 1910S.4 9 While currently defined in dictionaries in positive
terms such as "advocacy of the rights of women" 50 an article in
Harper's magazine in 1927 illustrates that, early on, feminism was
a controversial term associated with negative stereotypes:
"Feminism" has become a term of opprobrium to the modern
young woman. For the word suggests either the old school of
fighting feminists who wore flat heels and had very little femi-
nine charm, or the current species who antagonize men with
their constant clamor about maiden names, equal rights, wo-
man's place in the world, and many other causes . .. ad
infinitum.
51
Throughout the twentieth century, feminism was a keyword that
carried continuously changing meanings and significance.
1. Feminist Movements in the Early Twentieth Century
In 1920, as a result of more than fifty years of women's rights
activism, the Nineteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
was passed, guaranteeing women, at long last, the right to vote.52
Having accomplished this goal, women activists disagreed vigor-
ously about how next to proceed, divided by "tactical and ideo-
logical differences."153 Former suffragists, such as Alice Paul,
believed that women needed a constitutional guarantee of formal
equality in order to gain equal footing with men.5 4 Paul headed
the National Women's Party ("NWP") which, generally speaking,
included "affluent, business-oriented, and politically conserva-
48. SARA M. EVANS, TIDAL WAVE: How WOMEN CHANGED AMERICA AT CEN-
WURY'S END 4 (2003).
49. Id. at 2-3.
50. COMPACT OXFORD ENGLISH DICIONARY 579 (2d ed. 1993).
51. EVANS, supra note 48, at 6 (quoting Dorothy Dunbar Bromley, Teminist-
New Style, HARPER'S MONTHLY MAG., Oct. 1927, at 552).
52. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX
53. Verta Taylor, Social Movement Continuity: The Women's Movement in
Abeyance, 54 Am. Soc. REV. 761, 763 (1989).
54. See, e.g., DOROTHY SUE COBBLE, THE OTHER WOMEN'S MOVEMENT:
WORKPLACE JUSTICE AND SOCIAL RIGHTS IN MODERN AMERICA 60 (2004).
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tive" women.55 As professionals in the workplace, many of these
women had competed against men.5 6 For them, equality meant
securing equal treatment and, therefore, equal opportunity, with
their male counterparts. To achieve this goal, the NWP em-
barked on a decades-long quest to pass an Equal Rights Amend-
ment ("ERA"), starting in earnest in 1923, when Congress
introduced the measure.57 In direct opposition to the NWP
stood feminists who believed that women's equality would best
be achieved by removing gender-based barriers to the work-
place.58 These feminists typically were "poor, union-oriented
and politically liberal."159 Having worked in traditionally female
occupations,60 these women advocated for, among other things,
laws to facilitate women's capacity to earn a living.61 While both
groups were committed to assuring that the newfound right to
vote translated into full citizenship rights for women, these two
factions had "clashing class interests, fundamentally opposing
philosophies of economic and political reform, and deeply held
but divergent views on gender and women."162 For the NWP, for-
mal equality was a natural next step to the political equality wo-
men had attained with suffrage. They believed that women
needed an overarching guarantee that they would be allowed to
exercise their rights just as their male counterparts could. The
ERA opponents, on the other hand, believed that equal treat-
ment would mean that important differences between men and
women would be subsumed. These feminists were concerned
that formal equality would require women to meet a "male stan-
dard, which would encourage inequality."163 Accordingly, they
sought a legal regime that would reflect, for example, the reality
that women frequently had to both work outside the home to
support dependents and care for them; 6 4 thus, for these activists
workplace accommodations for women were key to attaining full
55. Id. at 60-61 (quoting Carl M. Brauer, Women Activists, Southern Conserva-
tives and the Prohibition of Sex Discrimination in Title VII of the 1964 CRA, 49 J. S.
HIST. 37, 40 (1983).
56. Id. at 65.
57. Id. at 60.
58. Id. at 61.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 65.
61. See infra Section D.
62. COBBLE, supra note 54, at 61.
63. Sybil Lipschultz, Social Feminism and Legal Discourse: 1908-1 923, 2 YALE
J.L. & FEMINISM 131, 149 (1990) (quotation marks omitted).
64. See, e.g., id. at 145-46.
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citizenship.65 In this regard, the rift between feminist groups was
not merely about strategy but also about the meaning of discrimi-
nation and equality.66
The end of World War 11 helped push both groups to the
political periphery. The return of soldiers from Europe and Ja-
pan meant a return to the feminine sphere for many of the wo-
men who had managed work and family life on their own.67
Additionally, societal pressure to conform to traditional gender
norms was great. According to public opinion polls of the time,
women who failed to get married were deemed "sick, immoral
and neurotic."168 Similarly, married women faced great pressure
to have children.69 Not surprisingly, cultural forces "denounced
feminism, discredited women who continued to advocate equal-
ity, and thus thwarted the mobilization of discontented
women."170
In the face of this backlash, few women claimed the label of
feminist. Verta Taylor, a scholar of social movements, writes that
"only the NWP members continued" to do so; and, in so doing,
they reflected what later would become the stereotypical image
of the "feminist." Namely, most of the NWP members were
"white, middle- or upper class, well educated, employed in pro-
fessional or semiprofessional occupations . .. and older (in their
fifties, sixties, or seventies)."171 Evans suggests that the societal
pressure to conform to gender roles, coupled with the negative
popular images of the term, conspired to keep young women in
the dark about the movement. Indeed, "by the 1950s feminism
was so thoroughly marginalized that most young women were en-
65. See infra notes 113 -141 and accompanying text.
66. These differences animated the discord that would characterize the women's
movement for the fifty years leading up to the 1977 National Women's Conference
in Houston. There is a rich body of literature detailing the struggle among feminists
from the 1920s through the 1970s, towards the end of the Second Wave feminist
movement. See, e.g., Jo Freeman, How "Sex" Got into Title VIIP Persistent Opportu-
nism as a Maker of Public Policy, 9 LAW & INEO. 163 (1991); Lipschultz, supra note
63; Serena Mayeri, Constitutional Choices: Legal Feminism and the Historical Dy-
namics of Change, 92 CAL. L. REV. 755 (2004); John Thomas McGuire, "The Most
Unjust Piece of Legislation": Section 213 of the Economy Act of 1932 and Feminism
During the New Deal, 20 J. POL'Y HIST. 516 (2008); Wendy Sarvasy, Beyond the
Difference Versus Equality Policy Debate: Postsuffrage Feminism, Citizenship, and
the Quest for a Feminist Welfare State, 17 SIGNs 329 (1992).
67. Taylor, supra note 53 at 764.
68. Id. at 765.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 767.
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tirely unaware of jt."172 Thus, just thirty years after the ratifica-
tion of the Nineteenth Amendment, feminism and the attendant
movement had shifted from being an "inclusive [movement]
across the class and political spectrum" at the height of the battle
for the vote, to being a term synonymous with marginalization,
claimed only by a few predominately white and economically
privileged members.73
Taylor posits, however, that the very exclusivity and homo-
geneity of feminism allowed the women's movement to survive,
particularly in light of its status on the political periphery. 74 With
women increasingly becoming active in other social and policy
issues, the NWP maintained a small, white, and privileged mem-
bership that could devote the time and money necessary to pur-
sue its ERA campaign,75 purposefully eschewing efforts to build
a larger base of support. 76 One member explained that "no mass
appeal will ever bring into the Party the type of woman who can
best carry forward our particular aims. We are an 'elect body'
with a single point of agreement."177 That single point of agree-
ment was a "feminist world view" that embraced a "feeling of
72. EVANS, supra note 48, at 6.
73. Taylor, supra note 53, at 767. As Taylor describes:
At the peak of the suffrage struggle, the NWP . . . attracted wage-
earning women from a variety of occupations as well as elite women
social activists. Its members had ties to political parties, government,
and industry, as well as to the socialist, peace, labor, and anti-lynching
movements. But when the NWP launched its ERA campaign, many
bodies organized on occupational, religious, and racial grounds and
devoted to other policy issues began to absorb women from main-
stream suffrage groups and siphon off NWP members. Thbis left the





76. Id. For example, noted civil rights attorney Pauli Murray attempted to me-
diate the differences among feminists and build a coalition between feminists and
civil rights advocates. She recommended a litigation strategy to achieving women's
equality that was modeled after the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People's (NAACP) own strategy to dismantle the nation's legal regime of
racial segregation. NWP members resisted her strategy, even suggesting errone-
ously that she sought to weaken the women's movement. See Mayeri, supra note 66,
at 762-69.
77. Taylor, supra note 53, at 767 (quoting letter from Ernestine Bellamy to
Ethel Ernest Murrell (May 24, 1953)).
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loyalty to our own sex and an enthusiasm to have every degrada-
tion that was put upon our sex removed."178
2. Feminist Movements in the 1970s and Beyond
Taylor notes that the existence of the NWP, its membership,
and methods contributed to the rise of the second wave feminist
movement.79 Thus, for example, among the founders of the Na-
tional Organization for Women are NWP members, who shared
the NWP's political connections, their strategies for change, and
their collective identity as feminists. 80 In the 1970s, passage of
the ERA was central to the feminist agenda. Commentators
have observed that feminists who focused on trying to get the
ERA passed distanced themselves from other social issues, just
as their predecessors had done.81 Winifred Wandersee notes:
And in fact, many women, feminist or otherwise, felt that the
attention given the ERA in the latter years of the drive for
ratification detracted from more pressing social and economic
issues. Women who did not identify so readily with the white
middle-class career-oriented women of the liberal feminist
movement, especially ethnic and minority women, were apt to
show little enthusiasm for the amendment. They complained
that ERA organizations failed to develop policy around the
whole issue of racism/sexism, and they were insensitive to mi-
nority participation within the reform structure. These women
felt left out of the network that ERA proponents had devel-
oped between 1972 and 1979.82
Once again, the central meaning of feminism was put to the test,
with the hope that a general emphasis on bettering women's lives
would be a unifying principle.83 Still, larger questions remained
about the term and the movement:
78. Id. at 769 (quoting AMELIA R. FRY, CONVERSATIONS WITH ALICE PAUL:
WOMAN SUFFRAGE AND THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT 197 (1976)).
79. Taylor, supra note 53, at 770. It should be noted that scholars have critiqued
the "wave" metaphor used to describe women's movements. In their view, the
"wave" terminology is historically inaccurate and incomplete because it ignores the
efforts of low-income women and women of color. Harnois, supra note 37, at 122
(citing ROBIN MORGAN, SISTERHOOD is FOREVER: THE WOMEN's ANTHOLOGY FOR
A NEW MILLENIUM (2003); Cathryn Bailey, Making Waves and Drawing Lines: The
Politics of Defining the Vicissitudes of Feminism, 12 HYPATIA 17 (1997); Catherine
M. Orr, Charting the Currents of the Third Wave, 12 HYPATIA 29 (1997); Kimberly
Springer, Third Wave Black Feminism? 27 SIGNS 1059 (2002)).
80. See Taylor, supra note 53, at 770-71.
81. WINIFRED D. WANDERSEE, ON THE MOVE: AMERICAN WOMEN IN THE
1970s 199 (1988).
82. Id. (citation omitted).
83. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
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Should women work inside existing institutions, such as the
political party system, universities, and corporations, or should
they create new ones? Should they prioritize economic rights,
reproductive rights, or cultural change? Should they seek alli-
ances with men? Can they work simultaneously on the
problems of race, poverty, and militarism while maintaining a
focus on sexual equality? The differences among feminists are
so deep that some regularly challenge others' credentials as
feminists. 84
The divide among women suggested not only differences in
perceptions of the term "feminism" and feminist goals, but also
feelings of marginalization and exclusion on the part of women
who embraced the overarching principles of feminism but recog-
nized the need to address other forms of oppression as well. Spe-
cifically, Benita Roth observes that feminist women of color had
long sought broad social change and urged white feminists to do
the same:
When feminists aim to change "gender relations" they are not
precluded from also asking for the rights due them as mem-
bers of racial/ethnic groups or classes. Feminists of color in
the second wave made just such claims on the basis of their
being women who were members of racially oppressed, eco-
nomically disadvantaged communities; selecting the label
"feminist" was not a simple or automatic act but a political
choice among other political choices. 85
Roth traces the developments of Black and Chicana femninisms in
the second wave, exploring "the roughly simultaneous emer-
gence by 1968 of white and Black feminist groups," and the femi-
nist organizing in the Chicana movement starting from 1969.86
She observes that "[fleminists of color saw themselves as belong-
ing to a different movement than white feminists did," specifi-
cally looking at the ways in which women of color feminists
"espoused a feminism that incorporated analyses of the conse-
quences of mutually reinforcing oppressions of gender, race!
ethnicity, and class (and, less frequently, sexual orientation)."18 7
Women of color thus sought to broaden the meaning of "wo-
man" and "feminism," building upon the efforts that took place
84. EVANS, supra note 48, at 2-3.
85. BENITA ROTH, SEPARATE ROADS To FEMINISM: BLACK, CHICANA, AND
WHITE FEMINIST MOVEMENTS IN AMERICA'S SECOND WAVE 9 (2004) (citing MYRA
MARX FERREE & BETH B. HESS, CONTROVERSY AND COALITON: THE NEW FEMI-
NIST MOVEMENT ACROSS FOUR DECADES OF CHANGE 9 (3d ed. 2000) for the term
"gender relations").
86. Id. at 8.
87. Id. at 11.
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in the previous century,88 and foreshadowing the development of
feminist legal theories that would place issues such as anti-essen-
tialism89 and intersectionality90 at the forefront of the movement.
C. Social Justice
In the academy, the term "social justice" is closely associ-
ated with the political philosopher John Rawls. For Rawls, social
justice requires examining the "basic structure of society," and,
significantly, articulating principles to construct a social frame-
work that is fair and just.9 1 Specifically, social justice is con-
cerned with how society's practices and institutions create and
distribute society's benefits and burdens in terms of "rights and
disabilities, privileges and disadvantages, equal or unequal op-
portunities, power and dependency, wealth (which is a right to
control the disposition of certain resources) and poverty."192
However, social justice's concern with fairness has deep roots
that precede Rawls and a reach that goes far beyond political
philosophy.
"Social justice" is a term that various constituencies have
used in the past; it continues to enjoy great purchase. As such we
consider it to be a keyword that is not limited to "the specialized
88. For example, Black women simultaneously fought against the practice of
lynching and worked towards Black women's progress through their own move-
ments that emerged at the end of the 19th century, in part out of "frustrat[ion about]
the negative epithets hurled at them [in society], and by the failure of Black leaders
to defend them or the race as a whole." PAULA GIDDINGS, WHEN AND WHERE I
ENTER: THE IMPACT OF BLACK WOMEN ON RACE AND SEX IN AMERICA 83 (2001).
In the 1970s, similar impulses fueled activism by Black women and Chicanas who
struggled with sexism in their respective liberation movements. ROTH, supra note
85, at 138.
89. See Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42
STAN. L. REV. 581, 585 (1990) (criticizing feminist legal scholars for failing to con-
sider race in theorizing about women).
90. See KimberI6 Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex:
A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and An-
tiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 145 (stating that the failure to analyze
such issues using a multiple axis "defeats efforts to restructure the distribution of
opportunity and limits remedial relief to minor adjustments within an established
hierarchy").
91. JOHN RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 7-11 (1971). The concept of social
justice, at least as it has been defined by Rawls, has been the subject of feminist
critique for, among other things, neglecting gender altogether, privileging men over
women, and, significantly failing to address patriarchy. See, e.g., Marion Smiley,
Democratic Citizenship v. Patriarchy: A Feminist Perspective on Rawls, 72 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1599, 1601 (2004). Smiley counters, huwever, that in some respects, Rawls's
account actually may be helpful in challenging patriarchy. Id. at 1600.
92. BRIAN BARRY, WHY SOCIAL JUSTICE MATTERS 355 (2005).
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vocabulary of a specialized discipline, though it often overlaps
with several of these," but rather an example of a word that while
"beginning in particular specialized contexts, [has] become quite
common in descriptions of wider areas of thought and experi-
ence."9 3 Thus, it is informative to examine both the use of "so-
cial justice" in the contexts of political philosophy and labor
history, as well as its ubiquitous presence in everyday culture.
Theories about social justice emerged in France and Britain
in the wake of the industrialization of the 1840s. Fueled by the
inequality of nineteenth century economic and social institutions,
the notion of social justice was a tool to challenge the "unequal
relations between employers and employees . .. the distribution
of income and wealth arising from the operation of capitalist in-
stitutions and the part played in people's lives by money."94
What was "revolutionary" about this way of thinking was that it
considered challenging "the justice of a society's institutions..
not merely at the margins but at the core."95
The concept of social justice evolved over the course of the
nineteenth century. Calls for social justice grew stronger as gaps
among the economic classes widened.96 In Germany and the
United States, social justice was seen as a means of countering
the revolutionary call of Karl Marx by providing Christian and
moral arguments for addressing the "'social question,' and what
the 'social classes' owed each other."197 By the 1890s it had
gained currency as a "plastic term that could embrace diverse
social goals, and applied particularly well to public policies, such
as protective labor legislation or widows' pensions."198 Thus, by
the early twentieth century, social justice became a popular
means for justifying "public policies that intervened in the rela-
tionship between capital and labor, and signified a redistribution
of resources based on fairness rather than pity or fear."99
More recently, social justice has great currency in contexts
as varied as human rights, hip hop, and education. For example,
in the context of labor, the non-profit organization Educating For
93. WILLIAMS, supra note 45, at 14.
94. BARRY, supra note 92, at 5.
95. Id.
96. KATHRYN KISH SKLAR, ANJA SCHULER & SUSAN STRASSER, SOCIAL JUS-
TICE FEMINISTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY: A DIALOGUE IN Docu-
MENTS, 1885-1933, at 7 (Kathryn Kish Sklar et al., eds., 1998).
97. Id. at 5-6 (quoting RONALD WHITE ET AL., THE SOCIAL GOSPEL (1976)).
98. Id. at 6.
99. Id.
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Justice has produced a multimedia presentation on international
labor abuses entitled Behind the Swoosh: Sweatshops and Social
Justice.100 In the world of hip hop, J.A.M. awards are given to
recognize social justice and responsibility. 101 The Agricultural
Justice Project, which has "pilot[ed] a food label that verifies fair-
ness for farmers and farmworkers alike[,]" describes itself as "a
non-profit initiative to create a fair and equitable food system
through the development of social justice standards for organic
and sustainable agriculture.110 2 There are films about social jus-
tice,103 poets who fight for social justice' 10 4 and social justice
blogs.105 The University of West Virginia has a strategic plan for
achieving social justice.106
In addition, the term social justice often is associated with
calls for diversity and anti-discrimination initiatives. For exam-
ple, a spokesperson for the Ford Foundation described the insti-
tution's values in terms of "a bedrock commitment to social
justice and innovation and to helping those whose voices are not
heard for any number of reasons, whether economic or because
of discrimination.11 07 Similarly, the Social Justice Education
Program at the University of Massachusetts describes its theory
and practice as "rooted in the civil rights social movements of the
past forty years, within which concepts of social justice, oppres-
sion and liberation are central categories for analyzing, evaluat-
100. Educating for Justice, Behind the Swoosh: Sweatshops and Social Justice,
http://www.educatingforjustice.orglsweatshops.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2008).
101. Chris Richburg, Snoop, Talib, Others Honor Jam Master Jay at J.A.M.
Awards, Oct. 5, 2007, http://allhiphop.com/stories/news/archive/2007/10/05/18692373.
aspx (quoting foundation creator and J.A.M. co-host Terrn Corley-Mizell) ("Every
year, one honoree from the Hip-Hop community will be selected and honored in the
field of social [justice, one in the Arts and another in music.").
102. The Agricultural Justice Project, New Pilot Food Label Certifies Social and
Environmental Stewardship, http://www.cata-farmworkers.org/english /%20pages/la-
borstandardsorg.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2008).
103. For a list of social-justice related films, see School of Communication Amer-
ican University, Social Justice, http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/keywords/film/
(last visited Jan. 24, 2009).
104. Ram Devineni, Leading International Poets Fight For Social Justice and
Arms Control at World Social Forum, available at http://rattapallax.com/press/wsf-
release.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2008).
105. See, e.g., Identity Theory, Social Justice Blog, http://www.identitytheory.
comlsjblogl (last visited Oct. 27, 2008).
106. See The Strategic Plan for Achieving Social Justice at West Virigina Univer-
sity (2003), http://www.wvu.edu/-socjust/usstrategic.htm. In this plan, the "principle
of social justice encompasses the legal and moral obligations to promote opportu-
nity, equality, civility, and respect for all people." Id.
107. Stephanie Strom, Ford Foundation Selects Its New Leader From Outside the
Philanthropic World, N.Y. TimEs, Aug. 14, 2007, at All.
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ing and transforming interlocking systems of discriminatory
institutional structures and cultural practices."1108 Vanderbilt
University Law School has a social justice program that "4pro-
motes a wide variety of educational and scholarly activities aimed
at exploring the role of law in creating, perpetuating and eradi-
cating hierarchies of power and privilege in our society. The pro-
gram seeks to address inequalities based on race, ethnicity,
gender, sexual orientation and social and economic status, as well
as the responsibility of the legal profession to protect the inter-
ests of marginalized, subordinated, and underrepresented clients
and causes." 109 Columbia University's Teachers College presents
an annual social justice award "to honor the significant contribu-
tions of an individual who exemplifies the integration of mul-
ticultural initiatives with social action."' 10 Thus, in these
contexts, social justice seems to signal a commitment to address-
ing societal inequities.
Moreover, social justice as a concept of fairness and equality
continues to expand globally, such that the principles of social
justice may be understood as being part of the international
struggle for human rights and dignity."' Thus, the notion of so-
cial justice has evolved and continues to change, as scholars and
activists seek to build upon its emphasis on fairness for all in or-
der to develop a framework for transforming society and how its
institutions allocate resources, rights, and the capacity to exercise
108. University of Massachusetts Social Justice Education, Social Justice Educa-
tion Bodies of Knowledge and Practice, www.umass.edu/sje/overview.html (last
viewed Oct. 24, 2008).
109. Vanderbilt University Law School, Social Justice Program, http:/law.vander-
bilt.edu/academics/academic-programs/social-j ustice-program/index.aspx (last
viewed Oct. 24, 2008).
110. Teachers College, Columbia University, Winter Roundtable Social Justice
Action Award, http://www.tc.columbia.edu/centers/roundtable/index.asp?ld=Award
+Recipients& Info=Social+Justice±Action+Award (last viewed Oct. 24, 2008).
111. See, e.g. Joseph Kahn, Despite Buildup, China Insists Its Goals Are Domes-
tic, N.Y. TiMES, Mar. 17, 2007, at A3 (quoting Prime Minister Wen Jiabao of China,
"[(t]he two great tasks are, first, develop the productive forces of society and, second,
advance social justice and fairness"); United Nations Division for Social Policy &
Economic Affairs, World Day of Justice, http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/sociallintl
daysflntlJustice (last visited Jan. 24, 2009) (discussing the General Assembly of the
United Nation's declaration of February 20th as World Day of Social Justice and the
recognition by governments participating in the World Summit for Social Develop-
ment that "social justice, equality, and equity constitute the fundamental values of
all societies").
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rights. In this regard, social justice is consistent with, and indeed
an appropriate goal for, the feminist project.112
D. Social Justice Feminism
The NWMI is not the first instance in which the terms "so-
cial justice" and "feminism" have been paired together. In this
section, we examine both historical and modern-day usages and
examples of "social justice feminism."
1. Social Justice Feminists in the Early Twentieth Century
Historian John McGuire uses the term social justice femi-
nism to describe a movement of working- and middle-class activ-
ists in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 113
McGuire identifies this movement as beginning with the appoint-
ment of Florence Kelley to the general secretaryship of the Na-
tional Consumers' League in 1899."11
These social justice feminists focused on labor reform, first
in seeking reduced working hours and better working conditions
and later a minimum wage. As discussed above, this agenda
placed these feminists squarely at odds with the National Wo-
men's Party's advocacy for an Equal Rights Amendment in the
1920s. As McGuire explains, the social justice feminists had
turned their efforts to protecting women workers, with an eye
toward expanding workplace protections to all employees."15
112. Feminists often identify their work as social justice work. For example, po-
litical columnist Katha Pollitt describes herself as "part of a social-justice movement,
which is how I think of feminism." Deborah Solomon, Questions for Katha Pollitt;
Woman's Studies, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2007, §6 (Magazine), at 17. Moreover, on its
webpage, the magazine Bitch, which is about "pop culture, feminism, and media
criticism," states that it "encourage[s] people to consider feminism as a necessary
part of the broader social justice movement." Bitch: Feminist Response to Pop Cul-
ture, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.bitchmagazine.orglabout/faq (last vis-
ited Oct. 13, 2008) (alteration in original).
113. John McGuire, From the Courts to the State Legislatures.- Social Justice Femi-
nism, Labor Legislation, and the 1920s, 45 LABOR HIST. 225, 225-26 (2004).
114. McGuire discusses this movement in four stages. The first stage, from 1899
through 1911 focused on labor protection for women, primarily through litigation.
The second stage, 1911 to 1918, was marked by extensive legislative reform. In 1918,
the Women's Joint Legislative Conference was formed, marking the beginning of a
third stage. The fourth stage involved work with the Roosevelt New Deal in the
1930s for labor reforms. Id. For additional information on social justice feminists
and the activist work of Florence Kelley, see generally KATHRYN KISH SKLAR, FLO-
RENCE KELLEY AND THE NATION'S WORK, 1830-1900 (1995).
115. McGuire, supra note 113, at 238. Indeed, after Muller, the Court upheld a
number of statutes designed to protect male workers, in effect, extending the rule of
that case. See, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hosp. of D.C., 261 U.S. 525, 554 (1923)
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Thus, these feminists counted among their early successes Muller
v. Oregon.116 In that case, Florence Kelley and Josephine Gold-
mark teamed with then attorney Louis Brandeis to defend an Or-
egon statute that restricted the hours of working women in
certain industries. 117 The social justice feminists prevailed in that
case. The Court upheld the statute, in part because unlike the
male workers in Lochner v. New York,"18 these women lacked
full political and contract rights. Attorneys for the plaintiffs ar-
gued that women's health and safety, as well as their caregiving
responsibilities at home militated in favor of limited work
hours.119 In this regard, the social justice feminists hoped that
the victory in Muller would not only improve working conditions
for women, but also make work more compatible with their fam-
ily responsibilities. 1 2 0 For male labor law advocates, Muller was
to be a bridge facilitating state intervention on the part of work-
ers, both male and female: "they used women workers as a legal
category because they needed them as a wedge to enter a legal
system otherwise hostile to economic intervention."'12 1 However,
the Muller victory did not open the door to greater workplace
regulation as the social justice feminists hoped.
On the one hand, Muller did support shortened work hours
for men in certain industries.122 Feminists thought this precedent
could be marshaled to improve women's wages, which became
even more important post-Muller. "When hours were reduced,
hourly pay was not increased. Many women worked at piece-
work, paid by the product rather than their time on the job;
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (describing cases that applied Muller to men); Bunting v.
Oregon, 243 U.S. 426, 434, 438 (1917) (approving statute limiting the workday to ten
hours for employees in mills, factories or other similar enterprises); Wilson v. New,
243 U.S. 332, 332-33 (1917) (sustaining a statute limiting the workday to eight hours
for workers on interstate carriers). Indeed, by the time the Court decided Adkins, it
noted that state legislatures may restrict workers' hours without violating due pro-
cess "where work of long continued duration is detrimental to health." Adkins, 261
U.S. at 554.
116. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
117. See Joan G. Zimmerman, The Jurisprudence of Equality: The Women's Min-
imum Wage, the First Equal Rights Amendment, and Adkis v. Children's Hospital,
1905 - 1923, 78 J. Am. HisTr. 188, 199 (1991).
118. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
119. Sybil Lipschultz, Hours and Wages: The Gendering of Labor Standards in
America, 8 J. WOMEN's HiST. 114, 121 (1996).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917).
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fewer hours meant fewer pieces and lower pay."'123 Moreover, by
this time, more women were responsible not just for providing
care to their families, but also for supporting them economically,
a fact documented in a groundbreaking report by the Women's
Bureau.124 Minimum wages for women thus became an impor-
tant goal for social justice feminists.
Kelley and other social justice feminists lobbied successfully
for minimum wage laws; twelve states had such legislation by
1917.125 Activists were particularly hopeful when Congress en-
acted such legislation in the District of Columbia. For example,
"Kelley and [then attorney Felix] Frankfurter hoped the district's
minimum wage law would become a model for all the states."'126
However, in Adkins v. Children's Hospital of D. C. ,127 an em-
ployer challenged the law, arguing that it interfered with the
right to contract.128 Well-versed in the importance of wage laws
to women and their families, social justice feminists argued that
underpayment was harmful to women's health, suggesting that
the police power would support such legislation; the statute was
essential, they averred, to protect women's "subsistence, health,
and morals."'129 Social justice required 30 that such wage protec-
tion legislation remain on the books.
The Court disagreed, sharply rejecting these rationales, 31
instead finding that the minimum wage statute for women uncon-
stitutionally interfered with the freedom of contract. 32 Signifi-
cantly, the Court reasoned that Muller did not govern its
decision, in part due to the intervening passage of the Nineteenth
Amendment:
In view of the great - not to say revolutionary - changes
which have taken place since that [decision], in the contrac-
tual, political and civil status of women. . .it is not unreasona-
ble to say that these differences [between men and women]
have now come almost, if not quite, to the vanishing point. In
this aspect of the matter, while the physical differences must
be recognized in appropriate cases . .. we cannot accept the
123. Lipschultz, supra note 119, at 121.
124. Id. at 126.
125. Zimmerman, supra note 117, at 201.
126. Id.
127. Adkins v. Children's Hosp. of D.C., 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
128. Zimmerman, supra note 117, at 209.
129. Adkins, 261 U.S. at 558.
130. Id. at 561.
131. See id. at 559-60.
132. Id. at 554, 559.
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doctrine that women of mature age, sui generis, require or
may be subjected to restrictions upon their liberty of contract
which could not lawfully be imposed in the case of men under
similar circumstances. 133
Thus, the Court struck down the statute as an interference with
women's contractual rights - newly acquired rights pursuant to
the Nineteenth Amendment. With this enactment, the Court
reasoned that protecting women was not only unnecessary, it was
inimical to the "individual freedom of action contemplated by
the Constitution1134 and threatened the common good.135
Given their defeat in Adkins, social justice feminists were
concerned that an Equal Rights Amendment would be used to
undo hard-won protective labor legislation. 136 In retrospect,
such protectionist laws seem to echo archaic stereotypes about
women. However, as Joan Zimmerman observes, and as the fore-
going suggests, the social justice feminist agenda was about im-
proving the welfare of women and society, not reifying
traditional ideas about women's roles and weaknesses that were
reflected too often in the common law.137 Moreover, as Zimmer-
man explains, Florence Kelley objected to the courts' interpreta-
tion of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as
emphasizing freedom of contract and individual rights. 138 Such a
reading only helped the propertied and those in power; moreo-
ver, it was "a formidable barrier to [her] plan to use the police
power-the inherent power of the state to pass laws that protect
the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens - to enact laws that
served the interests of working people, and women and children
in particular.1139 To Kelley, the blanket approach to equality
represented by the ERA affirmed a formalist legal approach that
she feared would be detrimental in the hands of conservative
judges: "Thle definitions of 'equal rights' in the [Flourteenth and
[Fjifteenth [Amendments] have been continuously injurious first
to Negroes, and afterward to white women and children. I see no
reason for expecting the Court to interpret fresh attempts to put
133. Id. at 553 (alterations in original).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See supra note 115-117 and accompanying text.
137. Zimmerman, supra note 117, at 191-92.
138. Id. at 194-96.
139. Id. at 196.
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political and social equality into the Constitution more favorably
to women than they have done in the past."1140
While the arguments of Kelley and others had some impact,
ultimately, the formal equality strategy prevailed. In its earlier
drafts, the ERA included savings clauses that exempted protec-
tive legislation from its formal equality mandate as a way to in-
clude social justice feminists and retain the gains they had
achieved for bettering the lives of women.14 1 In the end, this lan-
guage was removed as the Adkins decision aligned the Court
with the formalist view espoused by the National Women's
Party.' 42 As Zimmerman concludes:
Legal requirements had forced both Kelley and [Alice] Paul to
frame their arguments about women's equality to conform to
judicial expectations. As both compromised themselves, they
drew further apart. The narrow judicial definition of women's
rights that emerged from their struggle exacted heavy costs.
By establishing a male standard that was itself based on a legal
fiction [liberty of contract], the Adkins opinion polarized the
women's movement and limited the debate over equality.
Kelley's imaginative vision of social reform and civic responsi-
bility for women and for all groups in the Republic was lost
not only to women of the 1920s but also to the historians who
have studied their debate.' 43
This chapter in the women's movement is consistent with
Brian Barry's description of social justice and demonstrates how,
early on, activists recognized its potential for effecting social
change for all.144 Specifically, as Barry stated, the "demand for
social justice can best be seen as a response to the inadequacies
of liberal justice."'145 Concern about this very issue led the "so-
cial justice feminists" in the United States to pursue change in
ways other than seeking formal equality through a constitutional
amendment, a strategy that continues to be in use today.
140. Id. at 224 (quoting Letter from Florence Kelley to Lavinia L. Dock (Nov.
24, 1923), inl EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT CORRESPONDENCE, 1923-1931 (National
Consumers' League Papers)).
141. Id. at 206-08.
142. See id. at 223.
143. Id. at 225 (alteration in original).
144. BARRY, supra note 92, at 3-13.
145. Id. at 23.
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2. Social Justice Feminism and Feminist Legal Theory
The dissatisfaction of social justice feminists with the "inade-
quacies of liberal justice" 46 marks one of the connections be-
tween social justice feminism and legal theory. Notwithstanding
the success of liberal feminism's emphasis on formal equality,
scholars have sought alternative accounts for women's subordi-
nation, accounts that neither rely on comparisons that treated
white males as the norm, nor assume that addressing the con-
cerns of a universal "woman" - typically, white, middle-class,
and heterosexual - will result in equality. The literature that
has emerged in response to these shortcomings helps clarify the
meaning of social justice feminism.
In this regard, we build upon one of the few works to use the
terms "social justice" and "feminism" together in feminist legal
theory. Specifically examining inequalities affecting women's re-
productive choices, Dorothy Roberts and Joan Callahan modify
"6social justice" with "feminism" to articulate an "approach to
questions of law and policy that address concerns about systemic
inequities.114 7 They argue that feminist social justice is superior
to liberalism and liberal feminism because both of these ap-
proaches focus inordinately on individual liberty without recog-
nizing other important considerations. 48 Roberts and Callahan
explain that:
privileged men have been the generators of liberalism and its
individualistic ontology of persons. It cannot seriously be con-
sidered coincidental that men, who are so often most free to
function autonomously (that is, relatively unimpaired by the
requirements of households, children, and community) are
also the primary creators and administrators of contemporary
institutions that encourage an emphasis on extreme individual-
ism, productivity, and competition between persons rather
than an emphasis on community, nurturing, and connected-
ness between persons - an emphasis that is common - indeed,
generally necessary - in characteristically female lives.' 49
In contrast, feminist social justice, according to Roberts and Cal-
lahan, construes individual liberty more broadly to encompass
the "moral equality of all persons, regardless of their social loca-
146. Id.
147. Joan C. Callahan & Dorothy E. Roberts, A Feminist Social Justice Approach
to Reproduction-Assisting Technologies: A Case Study on the Limits of Liberal The-
ory, 84 Ky. L.J. 1197, 1200 (1996).
148. See id. at 1206.
149. Id.
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tion."1150 Specifically, feminist social justice is based on the no-
tions that "respecting another person is not just limited to leaving
her alone; respecting another person involves attending to the
conditions that are necessary for her thriving. .... [Ilt also means
seeing that she has equally available to her the basic conditions
of meaningful self-direction. 151 Thus, under feminist social jus-
tice, liberty is not merely a negative concept, in the sense of be-
ing free from governmental interference.15 2 Indeed, elsewhere,
Roberts has written that liberty should be construed as a positive
right in certain contexts.' 53
What, then, are we to make of social justice feminism? Ex-
trapolating from Roberts and Callahan, we posit that social jus-
tice feminism reflects dissatisfaction centered more directly on
liberal feminism, particularly in light of the critiques mentioned
above. Thus, liberal feminism, in practice and in legal theory, has
focused primarily on a white, middle class, heterosexual female
subject, examining her status when compared with her male
counterpart. In its emphasis on formal equality, liberal feminism
has failed adequately to address other social and political struc-
tures that support patriarchy. Social justice feminism strives to
uncover and dismantle those structures, such as white privilege,
heterosexism, able-ism, and classism. These concerns are evident
in current strains of feminist legal theory, notably, critical race
feminism ("CRFY).
CRF contains strands of critical legal studies, critical race
scholarship, and feminism.' 54 While many of its adherents draw
upon mainstream feminist scholarship, they provide a "race in-
tervention in feminist discourse, [because CRE] necessarily em-
braces feminism' s emphasis on gender oppression within a
system of patriarchy."'15 5 However, one of CRF's contributions
150. Id. at 1207.
151. Id.
152. See id.
153. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Rust v. Sullivan and the Control of Knowledge, 61
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 587, 590 (1993) (asserting the existence of a positive right to
self-determination, which would require the government to provide services neces-
sary for participation in society, such as "abortion counseling [for] Title X patients").
Other feminist scholars have made similar arguments. See, e.g., Anita Allen, Coerc-
ing Privacy, 40 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 723, 748-750 (1999) (suggesting that the right
to privacy extends beyond freedom from government intervention to include certain
positive rights).
154. See Adrien Katherine Wing, Introduction to CRMCAL RACE FEMINISM 1, 4-
7 (Adrien Katherine Wing, ed., 2d ed. 2003).
155. Id. at 7.
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to the feminist canon is its theoretical analysis of multiple op-
pressions,156 particularly with respect to women of color. Indeed,
as Adrien Wing describes this movement, the theoretical impetus
underlying CRF echoes sentiments of many of the NWMI par-
ticipants. She writes that:
most CRE proponents have not joined the mainstream femi-
nist movement . . .. [iun some cases the refusal to become
associated is due to that movement's essentialization of all wo-
men, which subsumes the variable experiences of women of
color under the experience of white middle-class women.
Mainstream feminism has paid insufficient attention to the
central role of white supremacy's subordination of women of
color, effectuated by both white men and women.157
In other words, just like the advocates attending the NWMI
meetings, these scholars did not want to "do feminism" as it had
been done in the past. 158 In this regard, examining CRF and sim-
ilar strands of feminist legal theory is significant for better under-
standing social justice feminism.
As suggested above, social justice feminism shares with GRE
a concern about recognizing and addressing multiple oppres-
sions.159 This work is necessary not just for purposes of identity
politics, but to gain a fuller understanding of the multiple and
intersecting forms subordination can take. For example, the con-
cepts of intersectionality and anti-essentialism, discussed first by
KimberI6 CrenshaW160 and Angela Harris, 61 respectively, are in-
tended to highlight not only differences among women, but also
to identify strategies for addressing the myriad forms of inequal-
ity affecting them. In this vein, Mani Matsuda has written about
the importance of building coalitions across the intersections of
race, class, sexuality, ethnicity, among other forms of identity. 62
Doing so, she argues, is necessary to develop more robust theo-
ries to combat subordination. 63
156. See id.
157. Id.
158. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. See also OFFICIAL REPORT, supra
note 16, at 1-3.
159. See, e.g., Callahan & Roberts, supra note 147, at 1203.
160. See Kimberld Crenshaw, supra note 90, at 145.
161. See Harris, supra note 89 at 585.
162. Mani J. Matsuda, Beside My Sister, Facing the Enemy: Legal Theory Out of
Coalition, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1183, 1188 (1991).
163. See, e.g., id (observing that through "sometimes painful work in coalition
we are beginning to form a theory of subordination; a theory that describes it, ex-
plains it, and gives us the tools to end it").
158
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Indeed, as Matsuda suggests, critical race feminist scholars
viewing subordination through a cross-cutting lens have pro-
duced important works that make visible forms of subordination
that liberal feminism's emphasis on formal equality miss. For ex-
ample, Regina Austin explores the "impact of fast food on obes-
ity in a context of racial/ethnic and gender discrimination and
poverty," 164 a context overlooked by the popular film, Super Size
Me.16 5 Austin commends the film for demonstrating the credibil-
ity16 6 of the highly publicized and ridiculed tort claims brought
by African American women against McDonald's alleging viola-
tions of consumer protection laws and negligence for contribut-
ing to childhood obesity. 167 However, Austin criticizes the film's
neutral approach to the issue. She argues that filmmaker Mor-
gan Spurlock ignored the social, racial, and economic issues im-
plicated in his account of the fast food industry and, in so doing,
missed an opportunity to promote substantive change.1681 In this
regard, Austin likens the filmmaker's approach to tort law's fail-
ure to contextualize such claims and its attendant inability to ad-
dress meaningfully the material conditions that contribute to
poor people's detrimental reliance on fast food.'69
Austin's work reflects social justice feminism in a variety of
respects. First, it focuses on an issue that likely would have been
ignored under liberal feminism. Austin highlights the fact that
the proliferation of fast food and the obesity resulting from it
have a disparate impact on poor women of color,' 70 such as the
plaintiffs in Spurlock's documentary who sued McDonald's in
Pelman v. McDonald's Corporation.17' Additionally, she uncov-
ers the class inequalities that facilitate obesity among urban peo-
ple of color by highlighting the prevalence of "hunger or food
164. Regina Austin, Super Size Me and the Conundrum of Race/Ethnicity, Gen-
der, and Class for the Contemporary Law-Genre Documentary Filmmaker, 40 Lay.
L.A. L. Ray. 687, 693, 697 (2007).
165. See id. at 697-98. See generally SUPER SIZE ME (The Con 2004).
166. See Austin, supra note 164, at 690.
167. See id. (discussing Pelman v. McDonald's Corp., 237 F.Supp. 2d 512, 512
(S.D.N.Y. 2003)).
168. Austin, supra note 164, at 697-98.
169. Id. at 717-18. See infra notes 174-76 and accompanying text.
170. See Austin, supra note 164, at 699 (explaining that 53.9% of black women
are classified as obese compared to 34% of black men. 30.6% of non-Hispanic white
adults, and 36.8% of Mexican Americans).
171. See id. at 696, 698.
2010] 159
HeinOnline -- 18 UCLA Women's L.J. 159 2010
10 UCLA WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 18:131
insecurity," 1 72 the lack of healthy alternatives to fast food,173 and
the limited access to recreational outlets that would promote
physical activity.17" In Austin's work, we see how gender, race,
and class conspire to affect even the most basic decisions and
have serious health implications. In so doing, she has identified
the multiple oppressions at play in this context. Moreover, by
focusing on low-income women of color, she engages in social
justice feminism' s call to seek change "from the bottom up."175
Significantly, this article highlights how poverty contributes
mightily to inequalities in housing, education, as well as in living
conditions, affecting even the most mundane decision - what to
eat.1 76 In this regard, Austin's article also draws into question
the notion of autonomy and the extent to which women of color
may exercise agency in their communities. The article further
highlights the link between popular culture and the law as tools
for making systemic change.
Austin's work illustrates the social justice feminism that per-
meates much of current feminist legal theory.177 As the forego-
172. Austin, supra note 164, at 701. "A person who is poor and obese may be a
person who goes hungry or cuts back on her or his caloric intake for a given period
and then compensates by overeating during other periods." Id.
173. See id. at 702, 704 (observing the lack of grocery stores and dining alterna-
tives in urban areas and noting that some "communities seem saturated with fast-
food restaurants; at least one study undertaken in pre-Katrina New Orleans found
that the number of fast-food restaurants in black neighborhoods exceeded the num-
ber in white neighborhoods").
174. Id. at 710. Austin notes that "urban schools . .. lack adequate recreational
facilities; playgrounds may be taken up with trailers to relieve overcrowding . .. or
they may be poorly maintained and dangerous. Security concerns may keep chil-
dren indoors and out of harm's way; girls are more likely to be handicapped in this
regard than boys." Id at 710-11.
175. Mani J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Repara-
tions, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. REV. 323, 387-88 (1987) (urging critical theorists to focus
on the concerns of oppressed persons of color, including working with them to de-
velop appropriate law reform strategies).
176. Austin, supra note 164, at 701-04.
177. For other examples of engagement in social justice feminism throughout
current feminist legal theory, see Martha Albertson Fineman, Gender and Law:
Feminist Legal Theory's Role in New Legal Realism, 2005 Wis. L. REV. 405, 419
(2005) (advocating for a reconceptualization of family and dependency in family law
that moves beyond gender roles); Tanya Kateri Hern~ndez, A Critical Race Femi-
nism Empirical Research Project: Sexual Harassment & the Internal Complaints
Black Box, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1235 (2006) (arguing that Title V11 sexual har-
assment law reporting requirements disparately impact women of color); Kristin
Brandser Kalsem, Bankruptcy Reform and the Financial Well-Being of Women: How
Intersectionality Matters in Money Matters, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 1181 (2006) (arguing
for an intersectional approach to modifying bankruptcy and consumer protection
laws); Twila L. Perry, Transracial and International Adoption: Mothers, Hierarchy,
160
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ing suggests, social justice feminism is structural in its orientation,
identifying issues that contribute to systemic subordination and
developing theories and strategies for change.
As the above demonstrates, the NWMI's call for social jus-
tice feminism has deep roots and much in common with the work
of other feminists seeking new paradigms effecting meaningful
change in lives of the most oppressed women. While feminism
emphasizes putting theory into practice, our project begins with
practice. Activists want to do social justice feminism. Thus, in
moving to theorize what that might mean in the context of a
twenty-first-century women's movement, we start, as the NWMI
did, with a look back at what we characterize as the modern-day
seeds of social justice feminism that were sown at the nation's
largest and most diverse gathering ever of women who wanted to
work to improve the lives of women - the 1977 National Wo-
men's Conference.
111. THE NATIONAL WOMEN's CONFERENCE: THE SPIRIT OF
SOCIAL JUSTICE FEMINISM
What Will You Reap? What Will you Sow?17 8
Barbara Jordan, Keynote Speech
National Women's Conference, 1977179
In our exploration of the concept of social justice feminism,
The National Women's Conference is a pivotal historical moment
because central tenets of the concept's philosophical framework
burgeoned there. Specifically, as will be discussed more fully be-
Race, and Feminist Legal Theory, 10 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 101 (1998) (urging
feminist legal theorists to challenge the underlying economic conditions that make
adoption an attractive option for low-income women in developing nations); Doro-
thy E. Roberts, Sources of Commitment to Social Justice, 4 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L.
REV. 175 (1998) (arguing for the creation of legal theories that would yield change
for the most oppressed women); Peggie R. Smith, Caring for Paid Care givers: Link-
ing Quality Child Care with Improved Working Conditions, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 399
(2004) (arguing that proposals to improve child care must simultaneously seek to
improve the labor conditions in the child care industry); Verna L. Williams, Private
Choices, Public Consequences: Public Education Reform and Feminist Legal Theory,
12 Wm. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 563, 567-68 (2006) (asserting that feminist theories
regarding private choice should be used to analyze public education reform).
178. OMFCIAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 223.
179. Jordan's keynote speech, as well as forty-two hours of speeches and debates
recorded at the National Women's Conference, is available at http://CHSWG.bing-
hamton.edu. Also, a document project on the National Women's Conference enti-
tled "How Did the National Women's Conference in Houston in 1977 Shape a
Feminist Agenda for the Future" is available at http://womhist.alexanderstreet.com.
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low, the Conference was productive, constructive, and healing in
ways that we characterize as social justice feminist in perspec-
tive.' 80 Before examining each of these concepts in detail, how-
ever, this Part will briefly describe the origins of the Conference
and what happened over those four days in Houston.
A. The Event Itself
1. How It Came About
The United Nations proclaimed 1975 International Women's
Year ("IWVY") and the ten years that followed as The Interna-
tional Decade for Women.' 8' Part of the program of the United
Nations was a mandate that participating nations set up commis-
sions to address the status of women and the road to gender
equality within their own countries. To comply with this direc-
tive, President Ford established the National Commission on the
Observance of International Women's Year ("the IWY Commis-
sion"). Pursuant to Public Law 94-167, Congress directed the
IWY Commission to organize and convene a national women's
conference, allotting $5 million for this purpose.182
In preparation for the Conference, the IWY Commission
conducted research, held hearings, and issued a report detailing
its findings in a 1976 publication entitled "To Form a More Per-
fect Union."'183 Based on that document, the Commission framed
fourteen resolutions as a suggested "core agenda" for meetings
held in every State and Territory of the United States.'8 14 At
these meetings, participants elected delegates who ultimately
would attend the convention. The IWY Commission also ap-
pointed delegates-at-large in an effort to comply with the statu-
tory requirement that the Conference "reflect the demographic
composition of women in the country and to include representa-
tives of organizations that 'work to advance the rights of wo-
men.""185 In addition to discussing and proposing issues related
180. See infra Part II.B.
181. SUSANNA DOWNIE ET AL., DECADE OF ACHIEVEMENT: 1977-1987 A RE-
PORT ON A SURVEY BASED ON THE NATIONAL PLAN OF ACTION FOR WOMEN 5
(1988).
182. OFFICIAL REPORT, supra note 16 at 251-54.
183. NATIONAL IWY COMMISSION, ". .. To FOMi A MORE PERFECr UNION..."
(1976). This report was a 382-page compilation of information gathered from inter-
views and surveys relating to "the status of women 200 years after the birth of our
Nation." OFFICIAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 9.
184. OFFICIAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 11.
185. Id. at 119.
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to the Commission-established core agenda, meeting participants
also examined issues of particular local concern, which the Com-
mission encouraged. 186 At the fifty-six meetings, participants
adopted an additional 4,500 resolutions.187 After further debate
and discussion, the outcome was a twenty-six-plank National
Plan of Action presented to the Houston delegates at the
Conference. 188
2. The National Plan of Action: Issues and Process
The National Plan of Action included planks on issues as
diverse as the women in attendance - from the arts and domes-
tic violence to child care, the ERA, and the treatment of women
in the media.189 In this regard, the Plan sought nothing less than
wholesale change in the lives of women in the nation. Over the
three day period from Friday, November 18, until Sunday, No-
vember 21, the over 2000 delegates 90 presented, debated, and
voted on each plank.191
The Conference officially opened at noon on Friday, when
runners who had carried the symbolic torch 2610 miles from Sen-
eca Falls, New York, arrived at the Houston Convention
Center.' 92 Poet Maya Angelou read the Declaration of Senti-
ments, which she had written to accompany the torch from Sen-
eca Falls. 193 With that auspicious beginning, participants
immediately set about the hard work of putting together a na-
tional plan. That evening and throughout the next three days,
caucuses met to discuss, debate, and finalize proposals created
during the five official sessions.' 94
186. Id. at 11.
187. BIRD ET AL., supra note 16, at 52.
188. OFFCIAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 11.
189. The Plan enumerated twenty-six planks as follows: Arts and Humanities,
Battered Women, Business, Child Abuse, Child Care, Credit, Disabled Women, Ed-
ucation, Elective and Appointive Office, Employment, Equal Rights Amendment,
Health, Homemakers, Insurance, International Affairs, Media, Minority Women,
Offenders, Older Women, Rape, Reproductive Freedom, Rural Women, Sexual
Preference, Statistics, Women, Welfare and Poverty, and Continuing Committee of
the Conference. Id. at 13-97.
190. There were 2,006 delegates: 1,403 elected from State and Territorial meet-
ings, 186 alternates, 47 IWY commissioners, and 370 delegates-at-large. Id. at 11.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 128.
193. Id. at 128-29.
194. These sessions were characterized by intense debate and discussion of the
details of each of the twenty-six planks, some of which were accepted as originally
proposed, others amended or substituted to reflect the concerns of those in attend-
2010] 163
HeinOnline -- 18 UCLA Women's L.J. 163 2010
164 UCLA WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 18:131
B. Sowing the Seeds of Social Justice Feminism
In her opening keynote address, Congresswoman Barbara
Jordan set the tone for the Conference:
This Conference is inclusive; everybody is here and everyone
must be free to define the meaning of total woman, for herself.
The differences among us at this Conference cannot and
should not be ignored. They are rational; the difference is ec-
ance. An examination of the sessions demonstrates that delegates were committed
to ensuring that the planks they ultimately adopted would be properly vetted and
would appropriately reflect the needs and concerns of the nation's women.
The first session began on Saturday morning, with opening remarks and speeches.
Each of the three first ladies in attendance - Lady Bird Johnson, Betty Ford and
Rosalynn Carter - spoke at this time. Id. at 138. Congresswoman Barbara Jordan
gave the keynote address. Id. at 140. With the second session came the first discus-
sions of the substantive provisions of the National Plan of Action. Eight micro-
phones were set up and color-coded cards were used to let the Chair know what
types of motions were being requested. For example, the cards indicated whether a
participant wished to speak for or against a motion or wanted to make an amend-
ment or substitution. Id. at 142. Participants voted on resolutions either vocally, by
standing, or where the vote was close, by the count of tellers. Id. at 141. At the
second session, delegates passed, in their originally proposed forms, the planks on
Arts and Humanities, Battered Women, Business, Child Abuse, Child Care, and
Credit. Id. at 143-45. The plank on Disabled Women was replaced with a substitute
amendment that the disabled women's caucus worked to draft all night long. Id. at
145.
At the third plenary session, participants passed the plank on Education with two
amendments. One stated that school systems should move against stereotyping on
the basis of race as well as sex. Id. at 146. The other amendment recommended
expanding the school curriculum to restore to women their history and achieve-
ments. Id. The planks on Elective and Appointive Office and Employment passed
in their original forms. Id. at 146-48. Then came a key moment in the Conference
when delegates presented the ERA Plank, which simply stated: "The Equal Rights
Amendment should be ratified." Id. at 148. After passionate debate, delegates ap-
proved the plank in a standing vote by an apparent margin of five to one. Id. at 148-
49.
The fourth plenary session was a marathon, in which delegates passed fourteen
planks, including two of the most controversial provisions in the National Plan: Re-
productive Rights, id at 162-63, and Sexual Preference, id at 165-66. During this
session, delegates also debated and approved an amended plank on Minority Wo-
men, id. at 155-60. For more discussion on this plank, see infra notes 228-29 and
accompanying text. Delegates adopted in their original forms the planks on Health,
Homemakers, Insurance, International Affairs, the Media, Offenders, and Statistics.
Id. at 153-67. Delegates adopted substitution planks on Older Women, Rape, id at
161-62, and Women, Welfare, and Poverty, id. at 167. They also adopted the plank
on Rural Women, id at 163-64, with amendments.
At the final plenary on Monday, a weary and disbursing crowd voted down the
twenty-sixth plank that would have established a Cabinet-level Women's Depart-
ment to coordinate social policy affecting women. Instead, delegates decided there
should be a Continuing Committee of the Conference. Id. at 169.
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onomic, cultural, social, political, ideological-the differences
are there.
The delegates to this Conference are certainly not of a single
mind. No one person and no one sub-group at this Confer-
ence has the right answers. 195
But she emphasized that there was important work to be done:
Congress approved $5 million with its congratulations, but, if
we do nothing here productive, constructive or healing, we will
have wasted much more than money.
We will have wasted, lost, negated an opportunity to do some-
thing for ourselves and for generations which are not here.
Not making a difference is a cost we cannot afford.
The cause of equal and human rights will reap what is sown
November 18th through November 21st, 1977.196
Looking back at the Conference, there was much that was pro-
ductive, constructive, and healing. In the intersections of these,
one can find the possibilities of social justice feminism. The next
sections explore the meanings of these words individually and
collectively.
1. Productive: Thinking Creatively; Thinking Big
To be productive means to have "the quality or power of
producing, esp[ecially] in abundance"; to be originative.197 It
means to yield or furnish "results, benefits, or profits."198, Those
who attended the Conference were keenly aware that what they
were doing was new and different. They were committed to com-
ing up with specific proposals, big and small, that would yield
substantive changes in the real world. Social justice feminist in
its praxis orientation, the end result of the Conference was a Na-
tional Plan of Action. As the Introduction to the Official Report
made clear, the conferees were thinking in terms of what can be
done now, as well as what steps could be taken toward more
long-term goals:
Some of the women's demands can be met by the present ses-
sion of Congress, by Executive Order, by action in the States
and in the private sector, or by a determination of those in
195. Id. at 223.
196. Id. (emphasis added).
197. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICriONARY 991 (11th ed. 2003).
198. Id.
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power to ensure more effective enforcement of programs that
have been allowed to languish or be circumvented.
More long-range demands, such as those for a full employ-
ment economy, a national health system, and an end to the
arms race, imply a fundamental reshaping of our present soci-
ety that would require mass movements of men and women
working together to seek to accomplish them.199
Not to be side-tracked by the question of limited resources,
the Official Report addressed this issue head-on: "No attempt
was made to apply a price tag to the National Plan of Action, nor
is it possible to estimate what it would cost if each recommenda-
tion were to become a reality."1200 However, the Report made
clear that many of the changes would cost no money at all:
There is no additional expenditure involved in giving women
an equal chance with men to receive an arts grant, or in voting
more women into office, or in making a woman a department
head, or in appointing women to the U.S. Supreme Court, or
in portraying women more realistically in the media and in
textbooks.20'
In this way the National Plan of Action recognized and proposed
strategies for dismantling what Iris Marion Young has identified
as the role of formal and informal patterns of society in reifying
oppression and domination of social groups.202
Indeed, the National Plan of Action anticipated that a new
social contract would be necessary, with a reordering of
priorities:
Equal pay for equal work and for work of "equal value"
would cost employers more, as would ending double discrimi-
nation against minority women.... Child care facilities, educa-
tion and job training programs, health insurance, and other
social programs would require Federal spending. Whether or
not in the long run these would involve spending more money
or only a reordering of present priorities for spending depends
on decisions about the kind of society we wish to live in.203
Importantly, the National Plan of Action recognized the value of
yielding "results, benefits, or profits" that were not measured in
only monetary terms: "A full employment society, for example,
that would make jobs available to all who seek work will un-
199. OFFICIAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 11-12.
200. Id. at 12.
201. Id.
202. See IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITCS OF DIFFERENCE 9
(1990).
203. OFFICIAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 12.
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doubtedly require outlays of money initially, but the return in
human productivity and dignity is incalculable. "2 0 4 At the Con-
ference, participants considered ideas within the primary context
of eliminating subordination and oppression from American
society.
2. Constructive: Moving Forward Differently
To be "constructive" is to promote "improvement or devel-
opment. 205 In many respects the Conference sought to promote
improvement and development, not only in the national status of
women, but also in the relationships among women themselves.
This necessary constructive criticism was in the spirit of moving
things along differently.
a. Re-envisioning the Invitation List
In order to facilitate truly constructive work, Conference or-
ganizers made significant efforts to ensure that vast and diverse
voices had a say in the way progress should develop. Indeed, the
very infrastructure of the planning and implementation of the
National Conference was meant to make this political process ac-
cessible to those who previously had not been included. The fol-
lowing details how organizers succeeded in achieving this goal.
The IWY Commission appointed local coordinating commit-
tees, selecting persons they believed would promote the greater
ideals of the Conference:
The committees were chosen to be representative of the popu-
lation of women they served and the special groups the law
said the Conference had to attract: representatives of organi-
zations working to advance the rights of women; members of
diverse racial, ethnic, and religious groups; unions; publica-
tions; women of all incomes and women of all ages.206
Local coordinating committees facilitated the State and Ter-
ritory meetings, using guidelines designed to yield as much diver-
sity among participants as possible. For example, to encourage
young people's participation, State and Territory meetings were
open to the public and "[amny duly registered female or male resi-
dent over 16 years old had the right to a vote." 207 This structure
204. Id.
205. MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DicriONARY, supra note 197, at 268.
206. BIaRD ET AL., supra note 16, at 47. What Women Want includes descriptions
of several of the state meetings, emphasizing their individual characteristics. See id.
at 48-53 (describing the Vermont, Alaska, and California meetings, among others).
207. Id. at 48.
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empowered young people to feel as if their voice mattered and
that they could play a part in implementing positive change.
The local committees also recruited persons who might not
ordinarily attend statewide meetings and made travel a possibil-
ity by providing financial assistance.208 Committee members
translated notices of meetings into many languages. For, exam-
ple, "[iln California bilingual teams went into the fields in every
county to tell workers about the program."209 There were also
many other creative outreach programs.
In South Dakota, the outreach chair was an American Indian
who visited her sisters living on reservations. In Connecticut,
coordinating committee teams visited homes for the elderly,
mothers on Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC), PTA meetings, handicapped women, and women of-
fenders. In rural Nebraska, planners made the rounds of farm
and ranch meetings. In West Virginia, they visited the wives
and widows of coal miners and talked with hairdressers and
neighborhood business women who could spread news of the
meeting by word of mouth. North Dakota mailed IWY pos-
ters to 600 beauty shops.210
Organizers recognized that having a truly representative group
was essential to drafting a meaningful National Plan of Action.
Emphasizing the ways in which this political conference sought to
be representative in a way that American politics was not,
Steinem described how Conference participants:
accepted a commitment to democratic inclusiveness that the
original ideas of the country did not address. True, the Ameri-
can definition of democracy has broadened since our founders
created a constitution for a limited constituency of white,
property-owning males, but the state meetings that led up to
Houston were generally more representative by race, age, eco-
nomic status, ethnicity and religion than the official legisla-
tures making decisions in those same states.211
Thus, in order to realize a new social contract, organizers set
out to assure that all affected parties would be represented. Ac-
cordingly, starting with the very planning of the event, Confer-
ence leaders committed not merely to acknowledging those "at
the bottom," but also to giving voice to their needs and concerns,
because doing so was necessary to the Conference's overarching
goal of addressing the numerous interlocking subordinating
208. Id. at 47.
209. Id. at 50.
210. Id.
211. Steinemn, supra note 16, at 11.
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structures constraining the lives of too many women. In this way,
the Conference sought to redress historical exclusions in both the
women's movement and American society. 212
b. Growing Recognition of Interlocking
Subordinating Structures
The constructive criticism of society that took place at the
Conference acknowledged the intertwined nature of multiple op-
pressions to some extent. For example, the 1977 Declaration of
American Women drafted in connection with the Conference in-
cluded statements such as the following: "We are poorer than
men. And those of us who are minority women-blacks, His-
panic Americans, Native Americans, and Asian Americans-
must overcome the double burden of discrimination based on
race and sex."1213 Moreover, the substantive planks also included
constructive criticism that often took a multiply conscious
perspective.
For example, the plank on Older Women addressed con-
cerns across lines of race, ethnicity, as well as age. Specifically, it
identified "poverty, isolation, and inadequate medical care" as
issues that "deprive many older women of a productive and se-
cure old age."1214 This plank observed that "[iln 1976 women
over 65 had the lowest median income of any age or sex group:
$2800, about half the income of men their age. Black women are
poorer than the average-nearly half the black women over 65
were living below the poverty level."2 15 It called for such actions
as increased home health and social services, bilingual and bicul-
tural programs, preventive as well as remedial health services,
and public transportation in both urban and rural areas.216 In
speaking about the Conference, Betty K. Hamburger, delegate
from Baltimore and member of the Maryland Advocates for the
Aging, commented:
Houston gave all older women a little more stature, which we
need most desperately. Because of mandatory retirement,
many older people feel that they've been kicked out of the
mainstream and are looked down upon as second-class, maybe
212. See id. ("It was as if women had recreated for themselves a temporary ver-
sion of the national political structure that had substantially excluded them for 200
years. .. )
213. OFFCIAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 15.
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third-class, citizens. It's worse to be black and old; it's worse
to be a woman and old. 2 17
Issues of class also played an integral role in many proposals
in the National Plan of Action. Conference delegate Marge Jin-
drich, a factory worker and member of the United Auto Workers
Union, explained: "A lot of people-and I blame the media-
picture women as working just for pin money or to get out of the
house. It's not true. Very few women work in factories unless
they have to."12 18 She described the lack of advancement for fac-
tory women, as well as the lack of union support for women's
issues:
The union says they are for women, but I see no concrete evi-
dence of it. As women, we make up almost half of the mem-
bership, but when we want something, we get a pat on the
head, just like they do to a pet dog: "Good dog, now go lie
down in a corner and don't bother me."121 9
Jindrich described the discriminatory treatment within the union,
which was all the more frustrating because of the absolute neces-
sity of the union for workers.220 She also elaborated on how cer-
tain minority women were especially silenced because of their
immigrant status: "Most of the workers in our plant are women,
Mexican women. They may not be here illegally, but they have
friends or relatives who might be, and they are afraid to speak
up, they might cause waves. The union is their only voice."122'
With respect to the specific planks, Jindrich highlighted the prior-
ity for factory women of such issues as battering and federally
funded child care.222
The Conference also implicitly critiqued institutional power
structures and, offered by its own example, a different form of
representation. Not only was a more truly representative constit-
uency present, as discussed above, there also was a different way
of engaging in the business of politics. California Assem-
blywoman Maxine Waters223 described this Conference as
"gunique in politics" and very different from other political con-
ventions with which she was familiar:
217. BIRD ET AL., supra note 16, at 23.
218. Id. at 30. Jindrich was one of the participants whose views were included in
What Women Want. See generally id.




223. Ms. Waters is presently a member of the U. S. House of Representatives.
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At a national political convention, there are different centers
of power, and people come ready to manipulate the rules to
keep somebody else from doing something. At Houston, the
challenge was to learn the rules so you could get something
done that was being overlooked. You didn't have to fight
somebody who was really against you.224
The emphasis was not only on productive change, but on reme-
dying that which had not been changed before.
c. Asking Important Questions
The Conference also was the site of constructive criticism of
the mainstream women's movement itself. Specifically, partici-
pants examined questions about who was represented, who
wasn't, and how those priorities played out.
In some parts of the National Plan of Action, there were
apparent moves to be more mindful of language. With respect to
the use of the word "woman," for example, the plank on Dis-
abled Women specifically provided that the word "woman" be
defined to include all women with disabilities. In order to trans-
late that linguistic inclusion into substantive practical improve-
ments, the plank clarified that "[t]he term 'bilingual' should be
defined as including sign language and interpreters for the deaf"
and that the "term 'barriers' against women and 'access' should
be defined as including architectural barriers and communica-
tions barriers."225 Similarly, the plank on Rural Women speci-
fied the breadth of the term "rural women," in providing that
"[a]ll programs developed on behalf of rural women should be
certain to include migrant, black, Native American, Alaskan,
Asian, and Hispanic women and all isolated minorities, and af-
firmative action programs should be extended to include all dis-
enfranchised groups." 226
The Conference also supported an atmosphere of sharing
that enabled women to explain why some felt differently about
certain issues than other women. Billie Nave Masters, for in-
stance, explained that "[tlhe feminist movement was a white wo-
man's movement for so long because when you are living at the
survival level you don't have time for anything else."12 27 How-
ever, she identified specific feminist concerns of Native Ameri-
can and Alaskan Native women, such as the destructive force of
224. BIRDn ET AL., supra note 16, at 24.
225. OFmciAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 32.
226. Id. at 87.
227. BIRD ET AL., supra note 16, at 37, 38.
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paternalism on Native people. 228 She also highlighted the great
injustice of forced sterilization that had been practiced on Native
American women.229
Waters explained that "there is a black perspective in all the
feminist issues in the National Plan."123 0 In discussing the plank
on battered women, for example, she highlighted the "frustration
of [black] men in seeking employment added to other sexist so-
cialization [as a phenomenon that] often leads to wife-beat-
ing."1231 She also provided historical information as to why black
women might not support certain issues that had been identified
as important for feminists. With respect to midwifery, for exam-
ple, Waters talked about midwives historically being very com-
mon in the Black community because women could not afford to
go to the hospital. Waters writes:
The new mothers suffered torn tissues, and the wounds were
mended with alum and water-the scar tissue is still there.
With this background, black women just don't understand
white women who say they don't want to go to sterile hospitals
to deliver their babies with uncaring doctors in an unwarm
atmosphere *232
Specifically, Waters argued that the proposed "improvement"
might limit the choice of some mothers because of subordinating
structures: "Black women are afraid that midwifery will be en-
couraged under Medicaid to save money."9233
As discussed in Part I.B. above, women of color had cer-
tainly been raising such issues for years. However, one of the
different and defining features of the Houston Conference -
part of its social justice spirit - is that women actually seemed to
be listening to each other-across their divides. Thus, there were
conversations about issues that facilitated what Barbara Jordan
also hoped would be accomplished in Houston - some healing.
3. Healing: Sharing and Concern
For many at the Conference, passage of the substituted
plank on Minority Women represented the most significant and
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 24.
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moving aspect of the Conference .2 34 The first paragraph of the
plank on Minority Women is itself very telling. It provided that
"6minority women share with all women the experience of sexism
as a barrier to their full rights of citizenship. Every recommenda-
tion of this National Plan of Action shall be understood as apply-
ing equally and fully to minority women." 235
The fact that this statement needed to be made indicates the
essentialism that marked the women's movement at the time.
"Women" tended to mean white women. However, the fact that
the statement was made can be read as a step toward addressing
this very problem. The next paragraph went on to acknowledge
"institutionalized bias" that "has led to the additional oppression
and exclusion of minority women and to the conditions of pov-
erty from which they disproportionately suffer[,]" calling for rec-
ognition and remedy of this double discrimination.236
As originally proposed, the Minority Women's Plank in-
cluded three short paragraphs .2 37 A unified Minority Caucus, af-
ter working tirelessly for three days, ultimately came together
and presented a substituted plank that listed specific concerns of
"American Indian and Alaskan Native women," "Asian/Pacific
American women,"~ "Black women," and "Hispanic women." 238
A woman representing each of these minority groups read their
specific provisions at the plenary session.239
The discussion accompanying this plank in the Official Re-
port took an intersectional approach to the subordination of mi-
nority women. It explained, with many specific examples, the
ways in which "the combined effect of race, sex, and economic
class can produce extreme hardship in the lives of these Ameri-
can women."1240 Before describing particular issues of different
minority groups, this discussion raised certain issues and illumi-
nated how minority women were discriminated against vis a vis
men, as well as white women. For example, in the area of health,
the plank provided statistics showing that "[miaternal mortality
was 29.0 per 100,000 minority women, as opposed to 9.1 per
234. Gloria Steinem described the "unity represented by the minority women's
resolution" as "perhaps the single greatest accomplishment of the Houston Confer-
ence." Steinem, supra note 16, at 15.
235. OFFICIAL REPORT, supra note 16. at 70.
236. Id.
237. See id. at 155.
238. Id. at 156-57.
239. Id. at 158-59.
240. Id. at 71.
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100,000 white women. The infant mortality rate among minori-
ties was 24.2 per 1,000 live non-white births as compared with
16.1 per 1.000 in the population at large." 241 Cited reasons for
these disparities included poor nutrition, less access to hospitals
or clinics, and a smaller likelihood of insurance coverage, leading
to the conclusion that "[tlhis lack of access to good or adequate
health care [was] a function of economic status. It represents a
clear example of the interaction of income with race and sex."1242
The plank made similar points about the disparate access that
minority women had to reproductive freedom, employment and
education.243
While much work remained to heal painful divisions among
women, Gloria Steinem characterized Houston as "the first pub-
lic landmark in a long suspicion-filled journey across racial barri-
ers."1244 Women were engaging with each other-talking and
listening to each other-in a way that made the possibility of
working together to improve women's lives something many wo-
men wanted. Billie Nave Masters summarized the Conference as
follows:
Sharing and concern seemed to be the keynote of the Houston
Convention ... . Some of the women [who came to Houston]
have changed jobs, some have moved into better positions and
some have gone back to school as a result of their Houston
experience. All have continued as advocates of the concerns
expressed in the Minority Women resolution. The confidence
of being heard and accepted, and formulating the resolutions,
has strengthened each and every one us.2 45
As the foregoing suggests, and as the 1977 Conference demon-
strated, progressive women's movements must act intentionally
to move forward. Specifically, they must recognize the context of
built-in subordinating structures within American law and soci-
ety, as well as the history of privilege and exclusion within the
women's movement in order to rid themselves of those struc-
tures. Those intentions, to be social justice feminist in perspec-





244. Steinem, supra note 16, at 16.
245. BIRD ET AL., supra note 16, at 38.
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IV. METHODOLOGICAL TOOLS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE FEMINISM
In her 1990 article Feminist Legal Methods, Katharine Bart-
lett described certain methods that feminists use when they "do
law"; "these methods, though not all unique to feminists, attempt
to reveal features of a legal issue that more traditional methods
tend to overlook or suppress."1246 As Bartlett explains, methods
matter "because methods shape one' s view of the possibilities for
legal practice and reform."1247 It also is helpful to try to articulate
methods because that very process can illuminate the nature of
what is being done and make it possible to do it better.248 Fol-
lowing Bartlett's example, in this Part, we articulate three meth-
ods of doing law from a social justice feminist perspective.
One method, looking to history to understand subordinating
structures, seeks to acquire more knowledge with which to un-
derstand and then dismantle the bases of societal institutions that
perpetuate hierarchies and inequities. Another method, examin-
ing the inter-relationships between interlocking oppressions, asks
how issues of gender, race, class, and other categories of identity
and experiences work together to create social injustice. A third
method, ensuring that principles of dismantling interlocking op-
pressions inform solutions, keeps the focus on bottom-up strate-
gies in fashioning remedies. We elaborate on each of these
methodological tools below.
A. Looking to History to Understand Subordinating Structures
Much has been written in the fields of feminist and critical
race theory about the potency of the power to label experience.
Important work has been done, both in uncovering "lost" histo-
ries249 as well as re-examining how history has been told and un-
246. Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 836
(1990). Bartlett describes three methods in detail: (i) asking the woman question;
(ii) feminist practical reasoning; and (iii) consciousness-raising. Id. at 829.
247. Id. at 830.
248. Id. at 831 ("As feminists articulate their methods, they can become more
aware of the nature of what they do, and thus do it better. Thinking about method is
empowering. When I require myself to explain what I do, I am likely to discover
how to improve what I earlier may have taken for granted.").
249. See, e.g., Adrienne D. Davis, Identity Notes Part One: Playing in the Light,
45 Am. U. L. REV. 695, 697 (1996) (contrasting two early and mid-nineteenth cen-
tury cases to "demonstrate[]I [both] that the black/white paradigm exercises influ-
ence on legal reasoning across time and geographic space, and also that the
paradigm itself appears to be a natural ordering, obscuring the assumption of a
white subject position"); Karen Gross, Marie Stefanini Newman & Denise Camp-
bell, Ladies in Red: Learning from America's First Female Bankrupts, 40 Am. J. LE-
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derstood. 250 History itself is constructed and has a point of view,
GAL HiST. 1, 6-7 (1996) (using a "ground up" approach to re-tell the early history of
American bankruptcy law from the woman debtors' perspective, which is vital be-
cause "[tjheir stories have so seldom been told that they are valuable in expanding
our understanding of the past and the present"); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Excluded
Voices: New Voices in the Legal Profession Making New Voices in the Law, 42 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 29, 38-39 (1987) (telling "the lost histories of the women who pio-
neered entrance to and practice at the bar[,]" and arguing that "these women, by
their very existence, challenged the dominant knowledge structures"); Debora L.
Threedy, Feminists & Contract Doctrine, 32 IND. L. REV. 1247, 1250 (1999) ("The
gendered nature of contract law's domain can be discovered by examining how wo-
men and women's concerns historically were excluded from that domain."); Karen
L. Tokarz, Separate But Unequal Educational Sports Programs: The Need for a New
Theory of Equality. 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L. J. 201, 226 (1985) (examining the
historic participation of women in men's sports and arguing that the memory of their
presence suffered "as the sports became more commercialized" because "[the
sports] became more sex-stratified and exclusionary"); Barbara Y. Welke, When All
the Women Were White, and All the Blacks Were Men: Gender, Class, Race and the
Road to Plessy, 1855-1 914, 13 LAw & HIST. REV. 261, 265 (1995) ("A more complex
answer to the questions of what were the nature of race relations in the post-emanci-
pation South and why Southern states resorted to statutorily mandated racial sepa-
ration lies in the stories of women.").
250. See, e.g., JOAN WALLACH Scorr, GENDER AND THE POLITrICS OF HISTORY
67 (2d ed. 1999) (taking a critical view that historians who ignore the deeper mean-
ing of the term 'gender' "uncritically accept masculine conceptions of class and rule
out feminist demands for attention to women and gender .. . unconsciously continu-
ing the politics of an earlier age. .. ); Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial
Discrimination through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court
Doctrine, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE
MOVEMENT 29, 29, 31 (Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Neil Gotanda, Gary Peller & Kendall
Thomas eds., 1995) (recounting the history of antidiscrimination law after Brown v.
Board of Education from the "victim perspective" of racial discrimination, which
"may be approached from the perspective of either its victim or its perpetrator....
In its core concept of the "violation," antidiscrimination law is hopelessly embedded
in the perpetrator perspective"); Linda K. Kerber & Jane Sherron De Hart, Intro-
duction to WOMEN'S AMERICA: REFOCUSING THE PAST 1, 3 (Linda K. Kerber &
Jane Sherron De Hart eds., 6th ed. 2004) (arguing that because "dates that mark
major turning points in traditional historical accounts do not automatically coincide
with those dates that mark significant changes in the lives of American women, wo-
men's history challenges us to re-examine conventional periodization"); Alan Free-
man, Racism, Rights and the Quest for Equality of Opportunity: A Critical Legal
Essay, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 295, 336 (1988) (exploring the nature of "equal-
ity of opportunity," and seeking "to recover lost possibilities and to comprehend the
many and subtle pressures that shape movements for social justice in a society whose
hierarchies rest upon class as well as upon race"); Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our
Constitution is Color-Blind, " 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 2 (1991) (dissecting the concept of
"race" in American history to argue that "the U.S. Supreme Court's use of color-
blind constitutionalism - a collection of legal themes functioning as racial ideology
- fosters white racial domination"); Charles R. Lawrence, 111, The Id, the Ego, and
Equal Protection: Reckoning With Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322
(1987) (arguing that most members of American society are unconsciously racist due
to "our common historical and cultural heritage in which racism has played and still
plays a dominant role"); Ian F. Haney L6pez, The Social Construction of Race: Some
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usually one possessed by those in power. Social justice feminism
continues the work of uncovering stories and experiences that
have not been told or included in accounts of history and exam-
ining how they alter ways of seeing. From a social justice femi-
nist perspective, emphasis is placed on history relating to the
intersections and the margins. The purpose of these inquiries is
to better understand how subordinating structures were created
and have been maintained. The goal is to use this knowledge in
working to dismantle these structures.
The members of the NWMI looked back at the historical
moment of the 1977 Women's Conference for ideas and inspira-
tion. For many attendees of the 1977 Conference, especially for
many women on the margins, it was one of the most significant
events in their lives. The Chair of the American Indian/Alaskan
Native Women's Caucus, Billie Nave Masters, wrote the
following:
The IWY Conference in Houston was the most intense and
meaningful experience I will have in my lifetime.... It was the
first time that a group of Alaskan Native and American Indian
women had come together nationally on their own initiative,
the first time that a group of native women had sought and
won positions on a national level. It was a warming experi-
ence. . .. We came together to exchange and share strength,
knowledge, and awareness. 25'
Others, like Lupe Anguiano, President of the National Women's
Program Development and Chair of the Welfare Reform Task
Force, imagined a future of a different kind after Houston, a time
when "[m]inority women's voices were heard and supported by
all[.]" 252 She believed that "the spirit of Houston will continue to
grow.1"253
As activists, looking to re-vitalize the women's movement,
the NWMI participants were interested in seeing what had cre-
ated this sense of coming together. In thinking about how to
Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 38
(1994) ("Historical forces create races, groups defined by the social significance of
their morphology and ancestry."); Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer
Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV.
1111, 1146 (1997) (examining "the disestablishment of gender and racial status law
during the nineteenth century in order to demonstrate that repudiating past prac-
tices has both preservative and transformative effects; it facilitates continuity as well
as rupture").
251. BIRD ET AL., supra note 16, at 37.
252. Id. at 31.
253. Id. at 32.
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move forward, the 1977 Conference also presents an opportunity
to explore what might be done differently to sustain a sense of
inclusion and belonging.
The Conference itself was grounded in history and, crucially,
this included looking at how subordinating structures and race
and class privilege were part of the history of the feminist move-
ment itself. Gloria Steinemn devoted substantial attention in her
Introduction to What Women Want to the historical basis for the
divide between Black and white women in the feminist move-
ment.2 54 After recounting the decision by those in power to give
the vote to Black men, but not women, Steinemn described how
"Black women were forced to painfully and artificially slice up
their identities by choosing to support their brothers at their own
expense, or, like Sojourner Truth, to advocate 'keeping the thing
going ... because if we wait till it is still, it will take a great while
to get things going again."' 255 Steinemn went on to describe the
schism that ensued:
Once it was clear that black men were going to get the vote
first, black women were further isolated by some white suf-
fragists who, embittered by the desertion of white and black
male allies, used the racist argument that the white female 'ed-
ucated' vote was necessary to outweigh the black male, "uned-
ucated" vote. Divisions deepened. 256
As discussed in the section above on healing, efforts were
made at the Conference to bridge these divisions and many posi-
tive steps were taken. However, one can employ the method-
ological tool of using history to understand subordinating
structures to the Conference itself and see where further reform
and development is needed.
For example, while there are specific examples of places
where the National Plan of Action addressed harms resulting
from the intersections of race and class with gender, these con-
cerns were marginalized or completely missing from certain
planks. In less overt ways, the National Plan of Action also reaf-
firmed essentialist thinking, with "women" unmodified tending
to be white women. For example, the plank on the media in-
cluded information from several studies, including a study by the
U.S. Civil Rights Commission entitled "'Window Dressing on the
254. Id. at 15-16.
255. Steinem, supra note 16, at 15.
256. Id. at 15-16.
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Set: Women and Minorities in Television."'12 5 7 This study con-
cluded that "'[tlelevision drama does not reflect the sexual and
racial/ethnic make-up of the United States. White males are
overrepresented; female characters are underrepresented; and
minority women are nearly invisible."1258 In many areas, minority
women were specifically mentioned, but suggesting that they
were not included in plain references to '"women"~ or
"females." 259
Heteronormativity also pervaded the National Plan of Ac-
tion. There was a plank on Sexual Preference which provided
that "Congress, State, and local legislatures should enact legisla-
tion to eliminate discrimination on the basis of sexual and affec-
tional preference in areas including, but not limited to,
employment, housing, public accommodations, credit, public fa-
cilities, government funding, and the military."1260 This plank also
specifically identified laws regulating private sexual behavior and
those inquiring into parents' sexual orientation in determining
child custody and visitation rights as problems to be addressed.261
The background to this plank detailed the discrimination
suffered by lesbians at the intersections of subordinating struc-
tures based on sex and sexual preference. In the area of credit,
for example, this background section explained:
A lesbian woman trying to obtain credit has two strikes
against her: as a woman, her income is considered less secure
than that of a man; as a lesbian, she may be considered less
stable. A heterosexual couple may co-sign loans, but a lesbian
couple often may not, even if both partners are employed and
have good individual credit ratings.262
However, the issues identified within this plank truly were con-
tained here, with little mention of sexual orientation outside this
plank at all. For example, there was no mention of the above-
described double discrimination against lesbians with respect to
credit in the Credit Plank.2 6 3 While the background section of
that plank included anecdotal stories from newspapers about dis-
criminatory credit practices against women in a wide variety of
circumstances, there was no example illustrating the particular
257. OFFICIAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 67.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 89.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 90.
263. See id. at 30.
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credit problems identified for lesbian women in the Sexual Pref-
erence Plank.264
Nor was there any mention of discrimination based on sex-
ual preference in other particularly relevant parts of the National
Plan of Action, such as in connection with discussions of repre-
sentations in the media or in educational textbooks or in images
of the family.265 In fact, one of the few places that issues relating
to sexual preference were mentioned outside the specific Sexual
Preference Plank was in the discussion section accompanying the
plank on the ERA which specifically provided that the "ERA
will NOT require the States to permit homosexual marriage. The
amendment is concerned with discrimination based on gender
and has nothing to do with sexual behavior or with relationships
between people of the same sex."1266
The history included in the Official Report did not recount
the split within the women's movement in the 1920s between
those singularly focused on the ERA and those concerned with
addressing specific social issues.267 Whether purposeful or not,
this exclusion is telling. Indeed, many of the primary organizers
of the Conference were very focused on the ERA; rallies in sup-
port of the Amendment were held in Houston. However, the
very structure of the National Plan of Action and the emphasis
and planning beforehand make clear that the Conference was
not solely about the ERA. Rather, the ERA was just one of
twenty-six planks. Indeed, the National Plan of Action resem-
bled the social justice feminist agenda of the 1920s in its broad
array of specific proposals to address systemic injustices. The
fact that the ERA was part and parcel of a much larger plan for
change may have caused some of the reconciliation and healing
that took place at the Houston Conference. However, as dis-
cussed above, there was a real push after the Conference to pri-
oritize passage of the ERA.2 6 8 As was true in the earlier part of
the century, this singular focus may have undermined much of
the progress that had been made in Houston.
Thus, a historical analysis of the Conference illuminates
both solid foundations on which a re-envisioned movement can
build, as well as fissures based on exclusions, privilege, and in-
264. Id.
265. See id. at 34, 67.
266. Id. at 51.
267. See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
268. wANDERSEE, supra note 81, at 52-54.
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consistencies from which such a movement can learn. Both so-
cial justice and feminism are concerned about the structure of
societal norms and practices and how they affect the distribution
of "rights and disabilities, privileges and disadvantage, equal or
unequal opportunities, power and dependency, wealth . . .and
poverty."1269 Fully apprehending the nature of constraining
norms and practices requires understanding and addressing their
history in order to identify and eradicate them. 2 70 As Reva Siegel
has pointed out, subordination persists in part because of its abil-
ity to transform in the face of policies aimed at its elimination.271
A firm grounding in history provides one with the necessary con-
text for achieving the primary goals of social justice feminism.
B. Examining the Interrelationships between Interlocking
Oppressions
While Bartlett identifies "asking the woman" question as an
important feminist legal method,272 the related social justice fem-
inist method is more akin to what Mani Matsuda has identified as
"asking the other question. 273 Because social justice feminism
does not privilege different forms of subordination, it not only
seeks to identify "the gender implications of rules and practices
which might otherwise appear to be neutral or objective" 274 but
also the implications of race, class, and other subordinating
structures.275
269. BARRY, supra note 92, at 355.
270. Siegel, supra note 250, at 1116, 1119, 1148.
271. Id. at 1119.
272. Bartlett, supra note 246, at 837.
273. Matsuda, supra note 162, at 1189.
274. Bartlett, supra note 246, at 837.
275. See id. at 847 (discussing "converting the woman question into the question
of the excluded") (citing ELIZABETH SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS
OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST THOUGHT (1988)). Bartlett also suggests that
[u]sing the "woman" question as a model for deeper inquiry into the
consequences of overlapping forms of oppression .... would require a
general and far-reaching set of questions that go beyond issues of gen-
der bias to seek out other bases of exclusion: what assumptions are
made by law (or practice or analysis) about those whom it affects?
Whose point of view do these assumptions reflect? Whose interests
are invisible or peripheral? How might excluded viewpoints be identi-
fied and taken into account? Extended beyond efforts to identify op-
pression based only upon gender, the woman question can reach forms
of oppression made invisible not only be the dominant structures of
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As Matsuda has made clear "while all forms of oppression
are not the same," there are "certain predictable patterns. 276
Specifically, Matsuda identifies "tentative, starting truths:"
All forms of oppression involve taking a trait, X, which often
carries with it a cultural meaning, and using X to make some
group the 'other' and to reduce their entitlement and
power. . . .All forms of oppression benefit someone, and
sometimes both sides of a relationship of domination will have
some stake in its maintenance... All forms of oppression
have both material and ideological dimensions. ... All forms
of oppression implicate a psychology of subordination that in-
volves elements of sexual fear, need to control, hatred of self
and hatred of others.277
From these patterns, she argues that one can discern the "inter-
connections of all forms of subordination.12 7 8
Matsuda employs the method of "asking the other question"
as a way to try to recognize and understand relationships among
subordinating structures. As she explains, "When I see some-
thing that looks racist, I ask, 'Where is the patriarchy in this?'
When I see something that looks sexist, I ask, 'Where is the
heterosexism in this?'"1279 Moreover, social justice feminism
does not privilege different forms of subordination. As Patricia
Hill Collins explains, in keeping with the tenets of social justice,
social justice feminism does not "elevate one group's suffering
over that of another."1280 She warns that doing so threatens to
limit the progress of social justice and urges instead that recogni-
tion of the interlocking nature of oppressions is essential to the
elimination of social injustice.28'1
Certain aspects of the National Plan of Action illustrate the
effects of bringing diverse women together. Rather than focus-
ing exclusively on sexism, interrelated issues were brought to the
forefront. The Health Plank, for example, called for the produc-
tive goal of a "national health security program," and addressed
a wide range of concerns including the need for more preventive
health services, better nursing homes and mental health facilities,
improved drug testing and reporting, more women in the health
276. Matsuda, supra note 162, at 1188.
277. Id. at 1188-89.
278. Id. at 1189.
279. Id.
280. PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK SEXUAL POLITICS: AFRICAN AMERICANS,
GENDER, AND THE NEW RACISM 3 (2004).
281. Id. at 7.
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professions, funds for alcohol and drug abuse research and treat-
ment, and health insurance and other coverage issues.282
However, as discussed above, there are many instances in
the National Plan of Action where more and different questions
were needed. In thinking about moving forward today, from the
perspective of social justice feminism, these questions would be
central to the development of plans of action.
C. Developing Solutions Informed by a Bottom Up Approach
In keeping with its feminist roots, social justice feminism is
committed to making material changes to people's lives, not
merely to theorizing. Theory is a means to making the substan-
tive reforms necessary for refashioning society. Accordingly, so-
cial justice feminist theory yields more than aspirational
principles; it consciously fashions strategies for social change.
Thus, for example, solutions proposed to address what was
identified in the 2003 Progress and Perils study as the number
one concern of women-violence against women-must be cre-
ated using an intersectional lens.28 3 The distrust of law enforce-
ment in communities of color, for instance, is well-
documented. 28 14 Proposals for addressing domestic violence from
a social justice perspective would make this systemic issue central
and explore strategies for change that would not only work
within the reality created by this societal problem, but also work
to dismantle this reality too.
Drawing on the work of the social justice feminists in the
1920s, this social justice feminist methodology also involves or-
ganizing around issues - problems to be solved. In putting to-
282. OFFICIAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 53-56. Health issues were of great con-
cern, with more than 400 resolutions relating to changes in health care policies and
procedures passed in the State and Territory meetings. Id.
283. PROGRESS AND PERILS, supra note 35, at 11. Ninety-two percent of the wo-
men surveyed identified "reducing domestic violence and sexual assault" as the
highest priority issue. Id. Domestic violence was one of the substantive areas that
Kimberld Crenshaw has examined to demonstrate the necessity of taking an inter-
sectional approach to legal issues. See generally Kimberlo- Crenshaw, Mapping the
Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43
STAN. L. REv. 1241 (1993).
284. See generally BETH E. RicHiE, COMPELLED TO CRIME: THE GENDER EN-
TRAPMENT OF BATTERED BLACK WOMEN (1996); Jenny Rivera, Domestic Violence
Against Latinas by Latino Males: An Analysis of Race, National Origin and Gender
Differentials, 14 B.C. THIRDn WORLD L.J. 231 (1994); Karin Wang, Battered Asian
American Women: Community Responses from the Battered Women's Movement and
the Asian American Community, 3 ASIANr L.J. 151, 172-73 (1996).
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gether a plan of action at the National Women's Conference - a
list of issues to actively pursue - Steinem describes how there
was much "blending of tactics and styles."1285 What she described
as "[p]refeminist, either/or, polarized thinking seemed to give
way to an understanding that victory was more likely if we sur-
rounded a goal from all sides."1286 Fifteen years later, Matsuda
echoed the importance of bridging differences to work together,
while at the same time acknowledging that work in coalition is
difficult, frustrating and painful.287 She queried, "if it is so hard
to work together, if the gulfs in experience are so wide, if the
false universals of the modern age are truly bankrupt, what need
binds us?"128 8 Her answer came from an acknowledgment of the
realities of the world we live in and the challenges we face: "[IW]e
cannot, at this point in history, engage fruitfully in jurisprudence
without engaging in coalition, without coming out of separate
places to meet one another across all the positions of privilege
and subordination that we hold in relation to one another. 289
The delegates at the 1977 Conference, as well as the participants
in the 2007 NWMI, also recognized that binding need.290
V. AN OPPORTUNITY FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE FEMINISM:
LONG ISLAND CARE ATF HOME v. COKE
What does it mean to "do" social justice feminism in light of
the foregoing? The Supreme Court's recent decision in Long Is-
land Care at Home v. Coke291 provides some insight, as well as an
opportunity for a social justice feminist intervention.
285. Steinem, supra note 16, at 17.
286. Id.
287. Matsuda, supra note 162, at 1187.
288. Id. at 1188.
289. Id.
290. For example, the opening session of the "Women Coming Together" Con-
ference at the University of Cincinnati College of Law, cited supra note 2, was de-
voted to discussing these practical issues. This session explored: "the role law has
and should play in the women's movement, developing and implementing a human
rights framework to effect change, and possibilities for forming alliances across
movements to broaden and strengthen the fight for all women's rights." The last
session challenged participants to organize a more diverse movement. Attendees
were invited to brainstorm about how to diversify the women's movement: not only
in terms of race, age, sexuality, and other characteristics, but also how we organize,
prioritize our issues, and support one another." Doing so was part of the event's
overarching focus on how to build a new women's movement, "learning the lessons
of the past-both the successes and missteps." (conference materials on file with
authors).
291. 127 S. Ct. 2339 (2007).
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A. Case Background
Evelyn Coke, a 73-year-old immigrant from Jamaica, 292 be-
gan working as a home health care attendant for Long Island
Care at Home ("LICH") in 1997.293 As an employee of this
agency, Ms. Coke worked in the homes of clients, helping them
with meals, laundry, personal hygiene, and taking medicine. 294
The job required long hours; sometimes Ms. Coke worked 24-
hour shifts, staying at clients' homes overnight.295 Frequently,
she worked 70 hours a week. 29 6 Ms. Coke requested but never
received overtime for those efforts, and, as a result, she. sued
LICH, needing the money now more than ever since kidney
problems and dialysis had sidelined her from the job market.297
Emblematic of the home health care work force that is over-
whelmingly female, poor, of color, and lacking employment op-
tions,298 MS. Coke's case is rich with opportunity for addressing
broad, cross-cutting social inequalities.
Ms. Coke challenged regulations enforcing the Fair Labor
Standard Act ("FLSA").299 According to LICH, these regula-
tions precluded Ms. Coke from receiving overtime pay or mini-
mum wage protections.300 Ms. Coke argued that the regulations
were inconsistent with Congress's intent to protect low-wage
workers. 30' Pursuant to the terms of the FLSA, requirements for
minimum wage and overtime do not apply to workers employed
on a "casual basis in domestic service employment to provide
babysitting services or any employee employed in domestic ser-
vice employment to provide companionship services for individu-
als who (because of age or infirmity) are unable to care for
292. Barbara Rose, Overtime Case May Change Pay Rules for Home Care Work-
ers, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 16, 2007, § Business, at 1.
293. Coke v. Long Island Care at Home, Ltd., 267 F. Supp. 2d 332, 334
(E.D.N.Y. 2003).
294. Rose, supra note 291, at 1.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Steven Greenhouse, Day in Court for Queens Home-Care Aide, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 17, 2007, at B2.
298. See, e.g., Peggie Smith, Home Sweet Home? Workplace Casualties of Con-
sumer-Directed Home Care for the Elderly, 21 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL'Y 537, 542 (2007) (citing STEVE DAWSON & RICK SuRIu'm, THE ASPEN INSTI-
TuTE, DIRECT CARE HEALTH WORKERS 6 (2001), www.directcareclearinghouse.org/
download/Aspen.pdf).
299. Coke, 267 F. Supp. 2d at 333. She also alleged several state law violations
that will not be discussed in this piece. See id.
300. Id. at 334.
301. Id. at 336.
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themselves "..1302 Regulations issued by the Department of
Labor ("DCL") define "domestic service employment" as "ser-
vices of a household nature performed by an employee in or
about a private home . . .of the person by whom he or she is
employed."1303 However, in defining "companionship ser-
vices," 304 the regulations state that the exemption applies more
broadly to those workers "who are engaged in providing com-
panionship services .. , and who are employed by an employer or
agency other than the family or household using their ser-
vices."1305 Because of this incongruence and the asserted conflict
with congressional intent, Coke argued that the regulations were
unenforceable. 306
A district court dismissed Coke's cause of action, upheld the
regulations, and concluded that Coke was exempt from FLSA
coverage. 307 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed,
holding that the regulation exempting domestic service compan-
ionship employees, 29 C.F.R.§ 552.109(a), was inconsistent with
congressional intent because it denied FLSA coverage to work-
ers who had been covered even before lawmakers intentionally
expanded the reach of the FLSA.308 LICH petitioned for and
was granted certiorari.309 The Supreme Court vacated the judg-
ment of the appeals court and remanded the case for reconsider-
ation "in light of the Department of Labor's Wage and Hour
Advisory Memorandum No. 2005-1[J]"310 which the agency pre-
pared during the litigation to explain the regulations at issue. On
remand, the Second Circuit found that the memorandum merely
302. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(15) (1998).
303. 29 C.F.R. § 552.3 (emphasis added).
304. The regulations define such services as
those ... which provide fellowship, care, and protection for a person
who, because of advanced age or physical or mental infirmity, cannot
care for his or her own needs. Such services may include household
work related to the care of the aged or infirm person such as meal
preparation, bed making, washing of clothes, and other similar
services.
Id. § 552.6.
305. Id. § 552.109(a) (emphasis added).
306. Coke, 267 F. Supp. 2d at 336.
307. Id. at 338.
308. Coke v. Long island Care at Home, Ltd., 376 F.3d 118, 134 (2d Cir. 2004)
("It is implausible, to say the least, that Congress, in wishing to expand FLSA cover-
age, would have wanted the DOL to eliminate coverage for employees of third party
employers who had previously been covered.").
309. Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 549 U.S. 1105 (2007).
310. Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 546 U.S. 1147 (2006).
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reiterated arguments the agency had made earlier and once again
concluded that the regulation was not enforceable. 311
When LIGH petitioned for review a second time, the Su-
preme Court granted certiorari to focus solely on the questions
of administrative law the case ostensibly presented: Was the com-
panionship regulation a legitimate exercise of DOL authority?312
And, if so, what level of deference should be afforded this regu-
lation, if any?3 13 A unanimous Court decided that, notwithstand-
ing the conflict within the implementing regulations, the DOL's
interpretation was "reasonable" 314 and entitled to the highest
level of deference.315 Accordingly, the Court reversed the Sec-
ond Circuit's judgment.316
B. Applying Social Justice Feminist Methodologies
The Supreme Court's opinion examined Coke as if it
presented only questions of administrative law. However, this
approach obfuscated the subordinating structures that the regu-
lations helped to support, which is evident when we apply the
social justice feminism methodologies discussed above.
1. Looking to History to Understand Subordinating Structures
The history of the FLSA sheds important light on how the
Court should have interpreted the implementing regulations.
Specifically, the ELSA, as originally enacted, played a significant
role in entrenching an economic system that relegated Blacks
and women to the bottom. Several decades after enacting the
law, Congress remedied this wrong, in part, by expanding the
scope of the Act.317
When Congress enacted the ELSA in 1938,318 it purposefully
excluded domestic and agricultural workers from its protections
in order to secure the support of Southern lawmakers. 319 At that
311. Coke v. Long Island Home Care at Home, Ltd., 462 F.3d 48, 52 (2d Cir.
2006) (per curiam).
312. Long Island Care at Home v. Coke, 127 S. Ct. 2339, 2344 (2007).
313. Id. at 2350-51.
314. Id. at 2351.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 2352.
317. See infra notes 324-25 and accompanying text.
318. See Brief for Urban Justice Center et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Re-
spondents at 2, Long Island Care at Home v. Coke, 127 S. Ct. 2339 (2007) (No. 06-
593) (hereinafter "UJC Brief').
319. Id. See also IRA KATZNELSON, WHEN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION WAS WHn-E:
AN UNTOLD HISTORY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA
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time, Blacks were 65 percent of the agricultural or domestic ser-
vice work force.320 Southern members argued that exempting
these positions was necessary to maintain a well-established sub-
ordinating social order. For example, Florida Representative
James Mark Wilcox explained:
There has always been a difference in the wage scale of white
and colored labor . .. . You cannot put the Negro and the
white man on the same basis and get away with it. Not only
would such a situation result in grave social and racial conflicts
but it would also result in throwing the Negro out of employ-
ment and in making him a public charge . . .. This is just an-
other instance of the well-intentioned but misguided
interference of our uninformed neighbors in a delicate racial
problem that is gradually being solved by the people of the
South.32'
Thus, notwithstanding its ambitious and laudatory aims, the
FLSA nonetheless entrenched the economic and social subordi-
nation of Blacks by denying them the wage protection that the
FLSA provided. Additionally, as the amici noted, this exclusion
reflected equally oppressive notions that domestic service was a
private relationship that did not need to be regulated because
this work, which typically was performed by women, was not
"real work . .. and . .. women did not work to support their
families."1322
Starting in the 1960s, Congress took steps specifically to
undo the injustices embedded in the FLSA. In 1961, Congress
"extend(ed] minimum wage and overtime protections to all indi-
viduals 'employed in an enterprise' of a certain size,"323 which
assured coverage of workers "employed by substantial firms and
agencies, rather than individuals" 324 including domestic service
workers. In 1966, lawmakers amended the Act again to provide
minimum wages to agricultural workers, recognizing that "immi-
55 (2005) (observing that Southern lawmakers "traded their votes for the exclusion
of farmworkers and maids, the most widespread black categories of employment,
from the protection offered by [the FLSA and other New Deal] statutes").
320. UJC Brief, supra note 317, at 2.
321. Id. at 3 n.2 (citing 82 CONG. RiEc. 1404 (1937)). Texas Representative Mar-
tin Dies echoed this concern, stating, "[Wlhat is prescribed for one race must be
prescribed for the others, and you cannot prescribe the same wages for the black
man as for the white man." KATZNELSON, supra note 318, at 60 (citing 82 CONG.
REC. 1837-38 (1937)).
322. UJC Brief, supra note 317, at 3 (citing, inter alia, Peggic Smith, Regulating
Paid Household Work: Class, Gender, Race, and Agendas of Reform, 48 Am. U. L.
REV. 851, 880-918 (1999)).
323. Id. at 4 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 203(r)).
324. Id. at 5.
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grant laborers were the largest and most vulnerable segment of
this workforce. 325 Lawmakers were mindful that, by modifying
the FLSA. they were addressing and remedying the past inten-
tional exclusion of already oppressed groups. For example, Rep.
Griffiths observed the following: "Women, especially black wo-
men, simply [had] not had a fair shake in the job market. It [was]
time they were given their due."1326 Thus, the amendments to the
FLSA were intended to extend much needed protections to
workers who, on account of their race and/or gender, had been
omitted from the landmark legislation. They were, indeed, reme-
dial. However, the Court's interpretation of the amendments in
Coke ignores this fact and, worse, imposes a harm that
lawmakers sought to redress.
2. Examining the Relationships Between Interlocking
Oppressions
As the foregoing suggests, until its amendments, the FLSA
was a tool for maintaining a race- and gender-based hierarchy in
the workplace and, as a consequence, in the social order. The
Court's decision in Coke only reinforces this subordinating struc-
ture in the guise of deferring to the administrative expertise of
the DOL.
Ms. Coke was paradigmatic of the workers affected by the
third-party domestic employee exemption. Most of the almost
one million workers in this area are female heads of household,
members of a racial minority, and poor.3 27 Additionally, many of
these workers have achieved a low level of education.328 The
work is very difficult: workers perform tasks related to the cli-
ents' medical care such as "taking vital signs . .. routine skin and
back care . .. giving massages and alcohol rubs . .. [and] as-
sist[ing] with medial equipment such as ventilators, which help
patients breathe. 329 Home health aides perform these duties
325. Id. at 4 n.4
326. Id. at 5-6 (quoting 119 CONG. Rac. 18, 341 (1973)).
327. See, e.g., Brief of Law Professors and Historians as Amici Curiae Support-
ing Respondent at 12, Long Island Care at Home v. Coke, 127 S. Ct. 2339 (2007)
(No. 06-593).
328. Brief for AARP and the Older Women's League (OWL) as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondent at 8, Long Island Care at Home v. Coke, 127 S. Ct. 2339
(2007) (No. 06-593) (hereinafter AARP/OWL Brief).
329. Brief of the Alliance for Retired Americans, et al., as Amici Curiae Sup-
porting Respondent at 10-11, Long Island Care at Home v. Coke, 127 S. Ct. 2339
(2007) (No. 06-593).
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under physically and emotionally stressful circumstances. In its
amicus brief, the Alliance for Retired Persons cited data showing
that these workers
have 280.5 occupational injuries and illnesses involving days
away from work per 10,000 full-time workers as compared to
188.3 for all private industries .... Home care workers often
suffer emotional abuse from mentally impaired clients who
may have severe behavioral problems. Homes may be "untidy
and depressing," and clients may be "angry, abusive, de-
pressed, or otherwise difficult."1330
Notwithstanding the significant demands inherent in this work,
home health aides are among the lowest paid workers in the na-
tion's service sector.33' Far from representing an opportunity to
gain secure economic footing, these jobs mean continued poverty
for too many workers. 332
Unfortunately, the low pay, long hours, and demanding con-
ditions are not unfamiliar to women like Ms. Coke. They engage
in this work to support their families and likely will continue to
do so because there are few alternatives available to them. Re-
moving the exemption to wage protections was critical to assist-
ing in their efforts towards economic self-sufficiency. However,
the Court's decision helps reinforce a pay structure that assures
that this job category will remain the preserve of poor women of
color, and thus, be perpetually underpaid.
3. Developing Solutions Informed by a "Bottom Up"
Approach
The Court's decision in Coke presents an opportunity to ap-
ply social justice feminism' s emphasis on organizing "from the
bottom up"33 3 to achieve change. In this context, social justice
feminism might require feminist legal advocates to re-examine
their agendas regarding employment opportunity to assure that
they fully address existing subordinating social hierarchies. In
other words, such groups should include the perspectives of the
most oppressed working women in an effort to identify strategies
that combat the multiple oppressions limiting the opportunities
that these women have to earn a living wage.
330. Id. at 12 (citations omitted).
331. AARP/OWL Brief, supra note 327, at 8.
332. Id. (observing that the median income for home health workers was $12,300
in 2001).
333. Matsuda, supra note 175, at 387.
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Many feminist legal advocacy groups focused on the Su-
preme Court's recent decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire and
Rubber Company, in which the Court held that Title VI1 claims
of pay discrimination must be brought within 180 days of the first
instance of discrimination. 334 Without question, this case repre-
sented a pinched view of Title VII that would constrain the abil-
ity of this statute to meaningfully accomplish its goals.33 5
Fortunately, feminist groups successfully organized for a legisla-
tive remedy for Ledbetter,336 one that better enables women and
other litigants to bring suits challenging pay discrimination. 337
The Coke case, however, which, in some respects, may hold
promise for much wider systemic change, is much less prominent
on the feminist legal advocacy agenda. For example, three prom-
inent women's organizations signed on to the brief filed in the
Coke case highlighting the intentional discrimination underlying
passage of the FLSA.338 Each of those groups identified a legisla-
tive fix to Ledbetter as part of its agenda339 But none articulated
334. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2163 (2007).
335. See, e.g., Martha Nussbaum, Foreword: Constitutions and Capabilities: "Per-
ception " Against Lofty Formalism, 121 HARv. L. REV. 4, 78-82 (2007) (arguing that
the Supreme Court's formalistic approach to Ledbetter renders the right to equal
opportunity in employment under Title VII illusory).
336. On January 29, 2009, President Obama signed the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay
Act of 2009. Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009) ("Ledbetter Act"). The Presi-
dent's remarks are available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press.office/Re-
marksbythePresidentUponSigningtheLillyLedbetterBill. (February 9, 2009).
337. Under the new law, discrimination in compensation occurs each time a
worker receives a paycheck adopted pursuant to an unlawful compensation decision.
It amends Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, as well as the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, and the Re-
habilitation Act of 1973. See Ledbetter Act cited supra note 336.
338. See UJC Brief, supra note 317 (listing Legal Momentum, the National Part-
nership for Women and Families, and the National Women's Law Center as amici
curiae).
339. For example, the National Women's Center has a website dedicated to this
effort that provides information about legislative developments in this area, see Na-
tional Women's Law Center, The Fair Pay Campaign, http://www.nwlc.orglfairpay,
and urged visitors to get involved in the advocacy effort. See, e.g., National Wo-
men's Law Center, Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.: The Supreme Court
Limitation on Pay Discrimination Claims and The Legislative Fix (2007), available at
http://www.nwlc.orgpdfIBroad /20Ledbetter /20Fact /20Sheet-Letterhead.pdf.
Even groups that focus on the issues confronting female low-wage workers have
turned their attention to Led better, rather than Coke. For example, Chicago-based
Women Employed, an organization dedicated to improving the lives of working wo-
men, pledged to "organize support for a federal legislative fix" for Ledbetter. See
WOMEN EMPLOYED, WOMEN EMPLOYED's 2008 LEGISLATI7VE AGENDA (March 11,
2008), http://www.womenemployed.org/fileadmin/templates/docs/VWELegAgenda08
-RGB.pdf.
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such a strategy for Coke. 340 Given the wage disparity issues in-
herent in Coke, a remedy for this case also should be part of the
agenda for advocacy groups, particularly since the women af-
fected are among the most marginalized and with the least
agency. Doing so is of particular significance given the limita-
tions of litigation in addressing such problems.341 Similarly, look-
ing at the issues implicated by Coke from the "bottom up" may
suggest alternatives beyond litigation. In this regard, a social jus-
tice feminist approach would view organizing women like Evelyn
Coke as essential to identifying appropriate goals and strategies.
VI. CONCLUSION
Activists concerned about what women want in the twenty-
first century want to do social justice feminism. It makes sense to
pair "social justice" with "feminism" at this critical time, a time
when divisiveness threatens the larger anti-subordination project
which embraces both concepts. Social justice brings to feminism
a particular emphasis on fairness and transformation; it is a mod-
ification that signals change. Given the change former candidate
Obama promised to bring to the nation, social justice feminists
may be in a position to "initiate new ways of seeing,"1342 and re-
alize new productive, constructive, and healing plans of action.
In this climate, social justice feminism may ignite the "broadly
based movement for egalitarianism,"1343envisioned at the Hous-
ton conference.
With this Article, we hope to move forward the conversation
that already has begun, both in the world of practice, as evi-
denced by the work of the NWMI, as well as in the world of
feminist legal theory. Drawing on history, we have taken initial
steps at broadly defining social justice feminism as that which is
productive, constructive, and healing. We hope that others will
340. At this writing, a visit to each group's website showed that the groups sup-
ported passage of the Fair Pay Restoration Act. S. 1843, 110th Cong. (1st Sess.
2007). However, the websites do not mention the legislation members have intro-
duced in the wake of Coke, the Fair Home Health Care Act of 2007. H.R. 3582,
110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007); S. 2061, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007). See also Legal
Momentum, http://www.legalmomentum.org; The National Partnership for Women
and Families, http://www.nationalpartnership.org; The National Women's Law
Center; http://www.nwlc.org.
341. See, e.g., Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, The Failure of Title VII
as a Rights-Claiming System, 86 N.C. L. REV. 859 (2008) (discussing the challenges
imposed by Title V11's prompt complaint and retaliation doctrines).
342. NEW KEYWORDS, supra note 44, at xix.
343. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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engage in this "inquiry into a vocabulary" 344 to add detail and
substance to these concepts, as well as to continue to develop
new ways of articulating social justice feminist work.
344. WILLIAMS, supra note 45, at 15.
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